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Recent Developments in US Copyright Law – Part II, Caselaw: Exclusive Rights 
on the Ebb? 
 
Jane C. Ginsburg 
Columbia University School of Law* 
 
Abstract 
 
The 1976 Act announces broad exclusive rights, offset by a myriad of 
specific exemptions, and one wide exception for “fair use.”  In words and 
intent, the exclusive rights are capacious, but new technologies may have 
caused some of the general phrases to become more constraining than might 
have been expected from a text whose drafters took pains to make forward-
looking.  Thus, the scope of the reproduction right turns on the meaning of 
“copy;” the reach of the distribution right on “distribute copies” and 
“transfer of ownership;” the range of the public performance right on 
“public” and “perform.”  Entrepreneurs and users of new technological 
means of exploiting copyrighted works have urged narrow constructions of 
each of these terms, arguing that broad interpretations will chill future 
innovation (and suppress present markets for copyright-exploiting devices or 
services).  Copyright owners, concerned that unfettered new uses will 
supplant traditional copyright-controlled markets, have contended that the 
literal language, or, failing that, congressional intent, encompass the 
contested use.  In addition, new technologies have called into question the 
identification of the person who “does” the copyright-implicating acts.  Who 
makes a copy when the act is decomposed into steps taken by different 
actors?  Who performs or displays a work when the work resides on one 
person’s server, but the public perceives it through another person’s 
website? 
 
Several US courts have narrowly construed the reach of the exclusive 
rights of reproduction, distribution, public performance and public display, 
thus putting into doubt their efficacy in the digital environment.  In 
particular, the Second Circuit’s recent decision in Cartoon Networks v. CSC 
Holdings, if followed, could substantially eviscerate the reproduction and 
public performance rights.  The growing number of decisions rejecting a 
“making available” right attests to some difficulties in adapting the 
distribution right to online exploitation.  By contrast, one bright spot for 
authors appears in the area of moral rights, in which digital media may 
provide a means to make at least some authors’ attribution interests 
enforceable.  Because the decisions emanate from lower courts, including 
first-level courts, it is too soon to discern whether US copyright law is 
adopting a constricted conception of the scope of the economic rights under 
copyright, and if so, whether the decisions betoken an evolving (if often 
unarticulated) determination that copyright prerogatives should yield to 
technological preferences.  In either event, the analyses and results contrast 
                                                 
* Thanks for suggestions and criticisms to Professor Graeme Austin, Professor Jessica Litman, 
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with solutions adopted in the European Union, and, in some instances, may 
be in tension with the US’ international obligations. 
 
 The previous installment of this Chronique addressed a pending legislative 
development, the creation of a liability limitation regime for the exploitation of 
“orphan works.”  The bill passed the Senate, but did not come to a vote in the House 
of Representatives before Congress recessed.1  Nonetheless, some form of orphan 
works legislation is likely ultimately to be enacted, if not in the current Congress, then 
in its successor.  One may hope that the next version of the bill will address some of 
the concerns expressed in Part I of this Chronique. 
 
This Part will consider recent developments in caselaw.  The abundance of 
recent judicial decisions in the US surpasses any one article’s ability to canvass or 
synthesize; this Chronique therefore not only must select from among the total 
number of decisions, but also will confine itself to the topic of exclusive rights. (I)   
As a result, it will not address questions of copyrightable subject matter, ownership, 
fair use,2 secondary liability and liability limitations for online service providers, or 
technological protection measures.3    Several US courts have narrowly construed the 
reach of the exclusive rights of reproduction (A), distribution (B), public performance 
and public display (C), thus calling into question their efficacy in the digital 
environment.  By contrast, one bright spot for authors appears in the area of moral 
rights, in which digital media may provide a means to make at least some authors’ 
attribution interests enforceable (D).  Because the decisions emanate from lower 
courts, including first-level courts, it is too soon to discern whether US copyright law 
is adopting a constrained conception of the scope of the economic rights under 
copyright, and if so, whether the decisions betoken an evolving (if often unarticulated) 
determination that copyright prerogatives should yield to technological preferences.  
In either event, the analyses and results contrast with solutions adopted in the 
European Union, and, in some instances, may be in tension with the US’ international 
obligations. (II) 
 
I. Exclusive rights and digital media 
 
 Section 106 of the US Copyright Act confers the “exclusive right to do and to 
authorize” a variety of acts.4  The statute formulates the exclusive rights in more 
                                                 
1 Congress did pass a law enhancing the remedies for violations of intellectual property rights, 
including copyright, see P.L. 110-403, 110th Cong. 2d sess. (October 13, 2008).  
2 For a series of recent articles addressing many aspects of the current fair use doctrine in the US, see 
Symposium, Fair Use: Incredibly Shrinking or Extraordinarily Expanding?, 31 Columbia J. L. & Arts 
433-635 (2008). 
3 I have commented elsewhere on the last three topics, see Jane C. Ginsburg, Separating the Sony 
Sheep from the Grokster Goats: Reckoning the Future Business Plans of Copyright-Dependent 
Technology Entrepreneurs, 50 U. Ariz. L. Rev. 577 (2008) (secondary liability, and liability of online 
service providers); Jane C. Ginsburg, The Pros and Cons of Strengthening Intellectual Property 
Protection: Technological Protection Measures and Section 1201 of the United States Copyright Act, 
16 Info. & Comm. Tech. L. 191 (2007).  Regarding the last topic, the Copyright Office has embarked 
on its triennial Rulemaking process to determine classes of works to exempt from the prohibition on 
circumventing technological measures that protect access to copyrighted works.  See, Copyright Office, 
Notice of Inquiry, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for 
Access Control Technologies, 73 Fed. Reg. No 194, p. 58073 (Oct. 6, 2008), 
http://www.copyright.gov/fedreg/2008/73fr58073.pdf 
4 17 U.S.C. sec. 106 provides: 
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general terms than some common law countries’ acts,5 but less sweepingly than in 
some Continental countries, including France6 and Italy.7  The style of drafting may 
carry substantive consequences: national laws that announce an all-encompassing 
“exclusive incorporeal property right which shall be enforceable against all persons” 
(France) or an over-arching right to “the economic use of the work in every manner 
and form” (Italy) might be said to set the default in favor of ranging all exploitations 
within the author’s monopoly (subject to specific exceptions).  Thus, the author’s 
rights presumptively encompass new exploitations enabled by new technologies. 
 
Exclusive rights articulated in more specific terms, by contrast, arguably give 
rise to narrower constructions.  The more detailed the text, the greater the prospect of 
ambiguity when new situations arise that the words do not clearly cover.  It might 
follow that courts interpreting such statutes would resolve ambiguities against the 
copyright owner, in favor of those who exploit works in the borderland between 
exclusive rights and free uses.  That prediction, however, assumes courts would infer 
from the law’s lack of generality a normative disposition to leave uncertain cases 
outside the copyright owner’s exclusive control.  In fact, such severe positivism does 
not accurately characterize all common law courts.8  Common law courts have filled 
                                                                                                                                            
Exclusive rights in copyrighted works 
Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive 
rights to do and to authorize any of the following: 
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; 
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or 
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; 
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and 
motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; 
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or 
other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and 
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means 
of a digital audio transmission. 
5 See, e.g., UK Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988, ss. 16-21; Australia, Copyright Act 1968, s. 
31. 
6 France, Code of intellectual property, arts. L. 111-1; L. 122-1. 
7 Italy, Copyright Law of 1941, art. 12(2) (“The author has in addition the exclusive right to the 
economic use of the work in every manner and form, original or derivative, within the limits fixed by 
this law, and in particular through the exercise of the exclusive rights indicated in the following 
articles.”) 
8 English decisions in the 18th and 19th centuries frequently extended authors’ rights beyond the set 
terms of the statutes, see, e.g.,  Jane C. Ginsburg, Une Chose Publique?: The Author’s Domain and the 
Public Domain in Early British, French and US Copyright Law, 65 Cambridge Law Journal 636 
(2006).  By contrast, 19th-century US decisions often interpreted the legislation narrowly to exclude 
unspecified forms of exploitation, such as translations.  See Stowe v Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201 
(C.C.E.D.Pa. 1853) (German translation of Uncle Tom’s Cabin not a “copy” of the English-language 
original).  See also Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment [2005] HCA 58 para 
190-209 (Kirby, J.) (limiting analysis of scope of Australian anti-circumvention provisions to words of 
statute: “The Parliament having chosen such an elaborate and specific definition for the key provision 
of the legislative scheme, a court should pause before stretching the highly specific language in order to 
overcome a supposed practical problem. To do so would not be to construe the text, but to substitute a 
new and broader text for the one chosen by the Parliament after extensive consultation, investigation 
and debate.”).  See generally Alain Strowel, Droit d'auteur and Copyright: Between History and 
Nature, in OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS: ESSAYS ON COPYRIGHT LAW 235 248, 252-53 (Brad Sherman 
and Alain Strowel eds., 1994) (“the natural law [continental droit d’auteur]-positivist [anglo-american 
copyright] distinction is nowhere as hard and fast as many commentators would have us believe” but 
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in legislative lacunae by reference to a protective purpose discerned from the statute’s 
general context or legislative history.9  Nonetheless, statutes that lack a general 
direction to interpret the scope of rights expansively lend themselves to more 
parsimonious parsing; when in doubt of the statute’s scope (or when skeptical of the 
desirability of protection), US and Commonwealth courts will demand that the 
legislature speak more clearly.10   
 
In particular, when new technologies test the contours of exclusive rights, the 
U.S. Supreme Court declared in its 1984 decision in Sony Corp. of America v. 
Universal City Studios (the “Betamax” case), that courts should proceed with caution:  
 
Repeatedly, as new developments have occurred in this country, it has 
been the Congress that has fashioned the new rules that new technology made 
necessary.  The judiciary's reluctance to expand the protections afforded by the 
copyright without explicit legislative guidance is a recurring theme.  Sound 
policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference to Congress when 
major technological innovations alter the market for copyrighted materials. 
Congress has the constitutional authority and the institutional ability to 
accommodate fully the varied permutations of competing interests that are 
inevitably implicated by such new technology. 
 
 In a case like this, in which Congress has not plainly marked our course, 
we must be circumspect in construing the scope of rights created by a legislative 
enactment which never contemplated such a calculus of interests.11 
 
Although this pronouncement might be seen as a general guide to 
interpretation of the scope of exclusive rights under the 1976 U.S. Copyright Act, one 
should recall its context: the “calculus of interests” at stake extended beyond the 
traditional controversies between copyright owners and commercial entities engaged 
in copying or publicly performing works.  Defendants were hardware manufacturers 
and distributors who disseminated a machine that enabled end users to make copies 
(in many cases for “time shifting”) of free broadcast television programs.  The statute 
                                                                                                                                            
different “interpretative framework” can lead to broader extent of authors’ rights in Continental 
countries). 
9 See, e.g., Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1283, 1290 (1991) 
(citation omitted): “Copyright protection is statutory, and the judiciary has shown a general reluctance 
to expand those protections, absent explicit legislative guidance. While there are sound historical and 
policy reasons for this consistent deference to Congress, Congress cannot immediately respond to each 
invention that hits the market. The courts must therefore use their best judgment to construe the 
meaning of certain words consistent with Congressional intent.” 
10 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 US 417, 429 (1984): “As the text of 
the Constitution makes plain, it is Congress that has been assigned the task of defining the scope of the 
limited monopoly that should be granted to authors or to inventors in order to give the public 
appropriate access to their work product. Because this task involves a difficult balance between the 
interests of authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the 
one hand, and society's competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the 
other hand, our patent and copyright statutes have been amended repeatedly.”  Stevens v Sony, [2005] 
HCA at para 207 (Kirby, J.) (“Had it been the purpose of the Parliament, by the enactment of the 
Digital Agenda Act, to create a right to control access generally, it had the opportunity to say so.”) 
11 Sony v Universal, 464 U.S. at 430-31 (citations omitted).    Cf.  ABC, Inc. v. Flying J, Inc., 2007 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13252 at *24 (SDNY 2007) (citing Sony in support of narrow interpretation of an 
exception to exclusive right). 
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contained no provisions detailing the derivative liability of enterprises that facilitate 
end-user conduct; arguably, the drafters had not confronted the possibility that end-
users might engage in economically significant acts of copying.12   Whether courts 
should be “reluctant to expand the protections afforded by copyright” when the 
defendant is directly committing acts which arguably exploit the statutory exclusive 
rights may be a different question.13  Indeed, the primary question is whether the 
interpretation the copyright owner seeks “expands” the scope of rights or simply 
applies extant rights to new situations.   
 
The 1976 Act, unlike its predecessors, announces very broad exclusive rights, 
offset by a myriad of specific exemptions, and one wide exception for “fair use.”14  In 
words and intent, the exclusive rights are capacious, but new technologies may have 
caused some of the general phrases to become more constraining than might have 
been expected from a text whose drafters took pains to make forward-looking.15  
Thus, the scope of the reproduction right turns on the meaning of “copy,” (A); the 
reach of the distribution right on “distribute copies” and “transfer of ownership” (B); 
the range of the public performance right on “public” and “perform” (C).  
Entrepreneurs and users of new technological means of exploiting copyrighted works 
have urged narrow constructions of each of these terms, arguing that broad 
interpretations will chill future innovation (and suppress present markets for 
copyright-exploiting devices or services).  Copyright owners, concerned that 
unfettered new uses will supplant traditional copyright-controlled markets, have 
contended that the literal language, or, failing that, congressional intent, encompass 
the contested use.  In addition, new technologies have called into question the 
identification of the person who “does” the copyright-implicating acts.  Who makes a 
copy when the act is decomposed into steps taken by different actors?  Who performs 
or displays a work when the work resides on one person’s server, but the public 
perceives it through another person’s website? 
 
A. Reproduction right 
 
 Section 106(1) provides for the exclusive right “to reproduce the copyrighted 
work in copies or phonorecords.”  Section 101 defines “copies” as “material objects . . 
                                                 
12 The legislative history accompanying the Sound Recordings Act of 1971, for example, stated that 
Congress did not intend to restrain home recording when the home recording was for private use.  The 
legislative history does not consider the possibility that end-users might capitalize commercially from 
home recording.  H.R. Rep. No. 92-487, at 9-10; see also H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 61 (1976) 
[hereinafter 1976 House Report] (explaining that the use of the words “to authorize” in section 106 “is 
intended to avoid any questions as to the liability of contributory infringers,” with no mention of end-
users). 
13 Indeed, even in the context of derivative liability, the Court may have retreated from the positivistic 
approach of Sony, having reversed the lower courts in MGM v Grokster, which had relied on the 
Court’s earlier pronouncement to reject the liability of an enterprise that facilitated infringing peer-to-
peer copying.  See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1046 (CD Cal. 2003) 
(citing Sony for “reluctance to expand”), aff’d. 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d. 545 U.S. 913 
(2005).  In Grokster, Sony’s caution to be “’circumspect’ in construing the copyright laws to preclude 
distribution of new technologies” was cited, but only in concurrence, see 554 U.S. at 960 (Breyer, J., 
concurring). 
14 See generally, Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 
857, 882-893 (describing structure of the 1976 Act). 
15 See, e.g., sec. 102(a): “Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works 
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed . . .” 
 6
. in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from 
which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either 
directly or with the aid of a machine or device.  . . .”  “’Phonorecords’ are material 
objects in which sounds, other than those accompanying a motion picture or other 
audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from 
which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either 
directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”  “A work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible 
medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or a phonorecord, by or under 
the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than 
transitory duration.”  Two recent decisions have explored the implications of the 
combination of these provisions to determine whether a digital file embodying a work 
is a “copy” or a “phonorecord,” and whether the embodiment must be more than 
merely transitory. 
 
1. What is a copy? 
 
 In London Sire Records v Does,16 record producers brought copyright 
infringement actions against students who allegedly copied and distributed 
copyrighted sound recordings over a peer-to-peer file-sharing network.  The students 
rejoined that the exclusive right “to distribute the work in copies or phonorecords” 
(emphasis supplied) was limited to physical, tangible objects, and therefore excluded 
the transmission of digital files.  The court recognized the far-reaching implications of 
defendants’ “sweeping” argument: if a “copy”17 that is distributed must be a distinct 
physical object, then “a great deal of internet commerce -- any involving computer-to-
computer electronic transfers of information” might fall outside the scope of 
copyright’s distribution right.18  Such an outcome was unlikely, observed the court, 
given Congress’ intention to enable copyright owners to control the distribution of 
“items that can reproduce the artist's sound recording. It makes no difference that . . . 
the items are electronic sequences of data rather than physical objects.”19  The court 
did not rest its rejection of defendants’ concept of “copy” on purely consequentialist 
reasoning, however.  The court also addressed the definitions of “copy” and 
“phonorecord” and the definition of “fixed” to which those definitions refer.  The 
“Copyright Act thus does not use materiality in its most obvious sense -- to mean a 
tangible object with a certain heft, like a book or compact disc. Rather, it refers to 
materiality as a medium in which a copyrighted work can be ‘fixed.’”20  A “fixation” 
occurs when the embodiment of the work in a “copy” or “phonorecord” permits the 
work to be perceived either directly or through the aid of a machine or device, or to be 
reproduced, or to be further communicated, for a period of more than transitory 
duration.   
 
[A]ny object in which a sound recording can be fixed is a ‘material object.’ 
That includes the electronic files at issue here. When a user on a peer-to-peer 
network downloads a song from another user, he receives into his computer 
                                                 
16 542 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D. Mass. 2008). 
17 Or “phonorecord,” which, in lay terms, is a copy of a sound recording; the court treated the terms 
“copy” and “phonorecord” interchangeably, see 542 F.Supp.3d at 166 n.14. 
18 Id. at 169. 
19 Id. at 170. 
20 Id. at 171. 
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a digital sequence representing the sound recording. That sequence is 
magnetically encoded on a segment of his hard disk (or likewise written on 
other media.) With the right hardware and software, the downloader can use 
the magnetic sequence to reproduce the sound recording. The electronic file 
(or, perhaps more accurately, the appropriate segment of the hard disk) is 
therefore a ‘phonorecord’ within the meaning of the statute.21 
 
Arguably, the court omitted part of the definition of fixation which might have 
lent some support to the defendants’ argument that a “copy” that is distributed must 
be “tangible” and therefore cannot include digital files communicated among 
computers.  The definition refers to “fixed in a tangible medium of expression” 
(emphasis supplied); traditional “tangible media of expression” such as books, CDs or 
video tape are free-standing and designed to be handled. One cannot put one’s hands 
on a digital file.  But one can put one’s hands on a digital recording medium, such as a 
CD or a DVD, or for that matter on an external digital hard drive, in which a work 
may be stored and from which it can be “perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated.”  Presumably, if one took a computer apart, one could also handle the 
internal hard drive or circuits in which the digital file is “magnetically encoded.”  The 
Copyright Act elsewhere specifies that “tangible media of expression” include those 
“now known or later developed;”22 Congress’ direction to encompass unanticipated 
storage media would be undermined by an interpretation which limited “tangible 
medium” to conventional free-standing formats. 
 
The London-Sire court addressed copies residing on the defendants’ hard 
drives, in their “sharing” directories.  On the spectrum of digital copies, one might 
deem these sedentary.  Other digital reproductions may be less stable.  Reproductions 
in a computer’s temporary memory (RAM copies) may be relatively long-lived, 
remaining in place for as long as the computer is turned on (which, in many cases, 
may be for hours, days, or longer) and as long as the data is not overwritten by other 
applications; but they may also be more transient, lasting only minutes or even 
seconds.  In particular, a reproduction in transit from one computer to another may be 
especially evanescent.  Is there a point at which a reproduction is too fleeting to be a 
“copy” within the scope of the exclusive right of reproduction?  The Second Circuit, 
in Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings,23 held that reproductions made in a computer’s 
“buffer” and lasting 1.2 seconds, were insufficiently “fixed” to be “copies.”  The 
ruling may be in some tension with decisions from other Circuits and a study by the 
Copyright Office interpreting the reproduction right to encompass a broad temporal 
range of “RAM copies.”24 
                                                 
21 Id. 
22 17 USC sec. 102(a). 
23 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008). 
24 See, e.g., MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993); Stenograph 
L.L.C. v. Bossard Assocs., Inc., 144 F.3d 96, 101-02 (D.C. Cir. 1998); U.S. Copyright Office, DMCA 
Section 104 Report (Aug. 2001) [hereinafter Copyright Office Section 104 Report], available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/sec-104-report-vol-1.pdf, pp. 107-23.  Of these 
authorities, however, only the Copyright Office report specifically addresses reproductions as transient 
as “buffer copies.”  The Ninth and DC Circuit decisions involved software loaded into RAM and 
apparently retained for some minutes.  But see MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm't, Inc., 2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 53988  *23 (D. Ariz. 2008) (reading MAI Sys. categorically to cover any RAM copying, 
without reference to duration of the copy; it is unclear how long the RAM copy of Blizzard’s 
videogame survived in the temporary memory of customers of MDY’s game-enhancing software). 
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The defendant, Cablevision, offered its subscribers a service that the plaintiff 
broadcasters and producers of audiovisual works labeled a kind of “video on 
demand,” and that Cablevision called remote time-shifting.  The service enabled end-
users to select from among programming that Cablevision distributed in real time 
(under license from copyright owners), and request that it be stored and subsequently 
transmitted to the users (without a license from copyright owners).  Cablevision 
maintained on its servers what one might envision as separate “storage boxes” for 
each user, so that as many copies would be made of any particular program as there 
were users requesting that the program be recorded.  This redundancy serves no 
apparent engineering objective; rather, the one-copy-per-user scheme seems to have 
been devised for the sole purpose of avoiding copyright-triggering acts.  User copies 
were created by splitting the broadcast programming data into one stream constituting 
the real time transmission to subscribers, and a second stream sent to a buffer, where 
the data representing each portion of the work would reside for some 1.2 seconds, and 
thence to the storage boxes of any subscribers who requested to view the 
programming at a later time. When a user wished to view the stored program, 
Cablevision’s transmission would originate from that user’s personal stored copy.  
The service thus could be conceived of as a kind of virtual VCR, with the storage 
occurring on Cablevision’s servers instead of at the user’s home, and the performance 
of the work occurring by means of a transmission from Cablevision to the user, 
instead of occurring wholly at home.   
 
The copyright owners alleged that Cablevision had made unauthorized copies 
in its “buffer” and on the sectors of its servers reserved for subscribers, and 
unauthorized public performances of the designated programming.  Cablevision 
claimed that the buffer copies were not “copies” within the scope of the reproduction 
right, and that the stored copies, albeit “copies,” were “made” by the users, not by 
Cablevision.  Cablevision also contended that the transmissions back to the users were 
not “public performances” because each copy’s viewing was limited to its maker.  
The parties agreed not to litigate whether the end-user conduct was infringing, or 
whether Cablevision might be secondarily liable for infringing end-user conduct.  The 
district court ruled that the buffer copies were sufficiently “fixed” to be actionable; 
that Cablevision, not the users, “made” the stored copies, and the transmission of the 
copied works was “to the public.”  The Second Circuit reversed on all three grounds.  
We will consider the first two grounds now, and the scope of the public performance 
right in Part I(C). 
 
The Second Circuit rejected the extension of the reproduction right to the buffer 
copies, on the ground that they did not meet the statutory definition of fixation.  The 
court emphasized what it called the “duration requirement” of the definition: “the 
work must be embodied in a medium, i.e., placed in a medium such that it can be 
perceived, reproduced, etc., from that medium (the ‘embodiment requirement’), and it 
must remain thus embodied ‘for a period of more than transitory duration’ (the 
‘duration requirement’). Unless both requirements are met, the work is not ‘fixed’ in 
the buffer, and, as a result, the buffer data is not a ‘copy’ of the original work whose 
data is buffered.”25  Although the buffer “embodied” the works, their embodiment 
was too transitory, the court held.  The court distinguished decisions from other 
                                                 
25 536 F.3d at 127 (citation omitted). 
 9
circuits for failure explicitly to address the duration requirement.26  It also criticized a 
report from the Copyright Office, which had confronted the duration issue, but had 
reached a different conclusion: “According to the Copyright Office, if the work is 
capable of being copied from that medium for any amount of time, the answer to both 
questions [embodiment and duration] is ‘yes.’ The problem with this interpretation is 
that it reads the ‘transitory duration’ language out of the statute.”27  Inquiring, 
therefore, “Does any such embodiment [in Cablevision’s buffer] last ‘for a period of 
more than transitory duration’?”28 the court answered no.  While ruling that 1.2 
seconds were not “more than transitory,” the court did not indicate what period of 
embodiment would suffice, although it did imply that “at least several minutes” would 
meet the duration requirement.29  Nor did the court suggest how to characterize 
durations falling between those two limits.30 
Despite its insistence that the Copyright Office and the plaintiffs were “read[ing] 
the ‘transitory duration’ language out of the statute,” the Second Circuit may in fact 
have been reading “transitory duration” into the wrong part of the definition of 
fixation.  Recall the definition: “A work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression 
when its embodiment in a copy or a phonorecord, by or under the authority of the 
author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.”  The Second 
Circuit has equated the “it” in “sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be 
perceived . . .” with the work’s “embodiment in a copy.”  Hence the court’s inquiry 
whether the embodiment lasts for a period of more than transitory duration.  But this 
construction is dubious both grammatically and as a matter of common sense.  
Grammatically, the “it” refers to the “work,” not the “embodiment.”31  Substantively, 
substituting “embodiment” for “it” would mean that the embodiment would be 
“perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated.”  But the embodiment – that is, 
the “tangible medium of expression” -- is not what the user “perceives.”  Indeed, for 
digital storage media, particularly those internal to a computer, the user will never see 
the “embodiment,” but the embodiment will enable the user to see the work, albeit 
“with the aid of a machine or device.”  By the same token, in the digital context, the 
“embodiment” is not “otherwise communicated,” because the communication will 
produce new embodiments; the work contained in those embodiments is what is 
“communicated.” 
                                                 
26 See supra note 24. 
27 536 F.3d at 129. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 128. 
30 See Copyright Office, Compulsory License for Making and Distributing Phonorecords, Including 
Digital Phonorecord Deliveries, Interim rule and request for comments, Fed. Reg. Vol. 73, No. 217 
(November 7, 2008) 66173, 66177 (“The [Cablevision] court’s reasoning leaves at least something to 
be desired and offers no guidance as to when a copy might be considered to be ‘embodied’ for ‘a 
period of more than transitory duration.’  . . . Indeed, it leaves open the possibility that a buffer copy 
that exists for several seconds might have sufficient duration to satisfy the fixation requirement. We 
can glean no principle from the Second Circuit’s opinion which offers any guidance as to where the 
line is to be drawn.”) 
31 This reading is confirmed by the House Report accompanying the bill that became the 1976 
Copyright Act, paraphrasing the definition of fixation: "Under the first sentence of the definition of 
'fixed' in section 101, a work would be considered 'fixed in a tangible medium of expression' if there 
has been an authorized embodiment in a copy or phonorecord and if that embodiment 'is sufficiently 
permanent or stable' to permit the work 'to be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated for a 
period of more than transitory duration.'"  1976 House Report, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined., at 53. 
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Although the court identified the wrong “it,” might the court nonetheless have 
arrived at the right statutory construction, excluding transient copies from the scope of 
the reproduction right?  The statute does, after all, make duration an element of 
fixation.  It also requires the embodiment to be “sufficiently permanent or stable.” 
What does it mean to embody a work long enough so that the work may “be 
perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory 
duration”?  The Copyright Office study urges: 
In establishing the dividing line between those reproductions that are subject 
to the reproduction right and those that are not, we believe that Congress 
intended the copyright owner’s exclusive right to extend to all reproductions 
from which economic value can be derived. The economic value derived from a 
reproduction lies in the ability to copy, perceive or communicate it. Unless a 
reproduction manifests itself so fleetingly that it cannot be copied, perceived or 
communicated, the making of that copy should fall within the scope of the 
copyright owner’s exclusive rights. The dividing line, then, can be drawn 
between reproductions that exist for a sufficient period of time to be capable of 
being “perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated” and those that do 
not.32  
This may be a reasonable teleological construction, but it does not grapple with the 
“more than transitory duration” language.  Indeed, the Report later suggests that 
“attempting to draw a line based on duration may be impossible.  . . .  Separating 
some temporary copies from others based on their duration poses similar difficulties.  
How temporary is temporary? Hours? Minutes? Seconds? Nanoseconds? The line 
would be difficult to draw, both in theory and as a matter of proof in litigation.”33  In 
addition, the Report, like the Second Circuit, appears to elide “work” and “copy.” 
 
 Consideration of the role of the Cablevision buffer copies may help answer the 
question whether they embody the work long enough “to permit the work to be 
perceived, etc. for a period of more than transitory duration.”  (Emphasis supplied.)  
The statute does not demand that the work in fact be “perceived, reproduced or 
otherwise communicated . . .” but rather that the embodiment make more than 
transitory perception, etc. possible.    The buffer copies supply the bridge between the 
real time transmission and the copies stored for individual users.  There is no question 
that the storage copies permit longer-term (still temporary, but not evanescent) 
perception, reproduction, or communication.  But without the buffer copies, there 
would be no storage copies.  The buffer copies are what enable the work to be 
perceived, etc.  Admittedly, the buffer copies do not enable the work to be perceived, 
etc. directly from those copies.  But the definition of fixation does not require that the 
work’s “embodiment in a copy or a phonorecord, by or under the authority of the 
author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it [the work] to be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration” 
from that embodiment.34  The “embodiment” need not be the direct source of the 
perception, reproduction or communication; it need merely “permit” them. 
 
                                                 
32 Copyright Office Section 104 Report, supra note 24, at 111. 
33 Id. at 113. 
34 By contrast, the Second Circuit requires that “the work must be embodied in a medium, i.e., placed 
in a medium such that it can be perceived, reproduced, etc., from that medium (the ‘embodiment 
requirement’), and it must remain thus embodied ‘for a period of more than transitory duration’ (the 
‘duration requirement’).”   536 F.3d at 129-30 (emphasis supplied). 
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One must acknowledge, however, that under that reading, most if not all 
transient embodiments may be “copies” within the scope of the reproduction right.  
Such a determination may be at odds with the legislative history of the 1976 Act.  The 
House Judiciary Committee Report, discussing the definition of fixation, suggests that 
some copies would be too transitory to be “fixed:” “The definition of ‘fixation’ would 
exclude from the concept purely evanescent or transient reproductions such as those 
projected briefly on a screen, shown electronically on a television or other cathode ray 
tube, or captured momentarily in the ‘memory’ of a computer.”35  The first two 
examples seem inapt, because they are not “embodiments.”  As to the last, arguably 
subsequent technological advances have undermined the Committee’s premise that a 
work’s “momentary capture” in computer memory would be insufficiently stable to 
permit the work to be “perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated for a period 
of more than transitory duration.”36  The embodiment does permit longer-term 
perception, reproduction or other communication, albeit by means of a subsequent 
embodiment (or embodiments).  As to the specific buffer copy embodiment, 1.2 
seconds might be “evanescent” to a human observer, yet provide ample time for a 
computer today to execute reproductions and communications of works received in 
active memory.37  Given this evolution, perhaps the Committee’s gloss should be 
disregarded, even by those who, notwithstanding the onslaughts of “textualism,”38 are 
inclined to seek guidance from legislative history.   
 
Whatever the value of that part of the 1976 House Report, might subsequent 
legislation nonetheless support the proposition that Congress assumed that transitory 
copies would not constitute “reproductions?”  In the 1995 Digital Performance Right 
in Sound Recordings Act, Congress amended section 115 of the Act to clarify that the 
compulsory license for reproducing and distributing sound recordings of non dramatic 
musical compositions applied to “digital phonorecord deliveries.”  The definition of 
digital phonorecord delivery specified: 
 
A digital phonorecord delivery does not result from a real-time, non-
interactive subscription transmission of a sound recording where no 
reproduction of the sound recording or the musical work embodied therein is 
made from the inception of the transmission through to its receipt by the 
transmission recipient in order to make the sound recording audible.39 
 
                                                 
35 1976 House Report, supra note 12, at 53. 
36 Only two years after the House Report, the Report of the Committee on New Technological Uses 
[CONTU] appears to reject that premise, see Final Report of the National Commission on New 
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works at 22 n.111 (1979).   
37 A computer’s memory access time, which is the time it takes to retrieve information in a computer’s 
memory and perform the requested function, is typically five to twenty nanoseconds.  Michael G. 
Schneider & Judith L. Gersting, Invitation to Computer Science:  Java Version 194 (3d ed. 2007).  A 
nanosecond is one billionth of a second.  Thus, in 1.2 seconds a computer can execute over 100 million 
operations. 
38 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation:  Federal Courts and the Law 29-37  (1997) 
(arguing that legislative history is not an authoritative indication of a statute’s meaning); John F. 
Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 673, 706-707 (1997) (arguing 
that reliance on legislative history creates an opportunity for unconstitutional, legislative self-
delegation). But see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 234-38 (1994) 
(offering a normative defense of legislative history).   
39 17 USC sec. 115(d). 
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This definition endeavors to distinguish certain transmissions governed by the public 
performance rights in the music and in the recorded performances40 from distribution 
of a “phonorecord” (copy) of the recorded performance of the musical composition; 
the compulsory license applies only to the latter.  The description of these 
transmissions as involving “no reproduction of the sound recording or the musical 
work embodied therein . . . from the inception of the transmission through to its 
receipt . . .” may not, however, accurately describe the range of exempted 
transmissions, because, at least as to some of them, notably webcasting, temporary 
reproductions will in fact be made “from the inception of the transmission through to 
its receipt . . .”  One might therefore infer that the technical copies made in the course 
of a non interactive subscription webcast do not count as “reproduction[s] of the 
sound recording or the musical work embodied therein . . .” And, pressing the 
advantage, one might further infer that if these technical copies are not 
“reproductions,” then technical copies generally are not reproductions.   
 
Nonetheless, a conclusion that sec. 115(d) assumes that transient digital copies 
do not come within the scope of the reproduction right may not be warranted.  It 
appears that, in 1995, when section 115(d) was introduced as part of the “Digital 
Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act,” the transmissions at issue were 
“preexisting subscription services,”41 such as Muzak, L.P.  Those services were not 
engaged in streaming; indeed the 1995 amendments seem not to have contemplated 
webcasting.42  Thus, in 1995, the definition probably did reflect the relevant 
technology.  The absence of an amendment in 1998 to the sec. 115(d) exemption of 
certain subscription transmissions from the definition of digital phonorecord 
deliveries, when Congress amended the scope of the sec. 114(f) compulsory license 
for non subscription transmissions to include webcasts thus may not strongly evidence 
Congressional determination that copies (or phonorecords) made in the course of 
audiostreaming are not “reproductions.” 
 
 Assuming transient copies can come within the scope of the reproduction 
right, it does not necessarily follow that a transient copy will always be a 
“reproduction.”  Returning to the 1976 House Report, it may be helpful to surmise 
why the Committee would have supposed the exclusion of “purely evanescent or 
transient reproductions.”  Congress might have sought to maintain clear lines between 
the reproduction and public performance and public display rights: the Report’s first 
two examples would come within the public performance or display rights, assuming 
they were made in, or to, the public.  But just as technological evolution has called 
into question the premise that momentary capture in computer memory would not 
“fix” a work,43 so have intervening developments blurred the line between 
reproduction and public performance or display.   The 1995 legislation recognizes the 
                                                 
40 See 17 USC sec 114(d)(2) (establishing compulsory license for webcasting of sound recordings); sec. 
106(4) (exclusive right of public performance  in the musical composition). 
41 17 USC sec. 114(d)(2)(B)(C),(f)(1). 
42 See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for the “Digital Millennium,” 23 Colum. VLA 
J.L. & Arts 137, 166-69 (1999) (examining how dispositions of 1995 amendments did not correspond 
to webcasting technology); id. at 167: “The digital transmissions reached by the 1995 expansion of the 
sound recording copyright turn out to have omitted a principal form of Internet exploitation of sound 
recordings: audio ‘streaming’ or ‘webcasting’ of recorded performances.” 
43 See supra note 36. 
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possibility that a digital transmission might result in both a digital phonorecord 
delivery and a public performance.44   
 
Nonetheless, even if technology has eroded the premises of the 1976 House 
Report’s exclusion of “purely evanescent or transient reproductions,” an economic 
intuition underlying the Report may guide us.  A transient copy will often, if not 
always, be ancillary to some principal operation that does come within the traditional 
scope of copyright.  In the case of streaming-only webcasting, for example, any 
reproductions would normally be ancillary to the principal, compensated, economic 
activity of public performance.  In the case of a licensed communication of a digital 
file for downloading, the transitory copies made between the source website and the 
recipient’s computer would come within the scope of the license.   
 
 The Copyright Office’s suggestion that economic significance could supply 
the dividing line between copies within and outside the scope of the exclusive right of 
reproduction not only avoids the metaphysical quandary of determining the temporal 
frontiers of a “reproduction;” it also offers a reason for excluding some “purely 
evanescent or transient reproductions”; they do not undermine the author’s exercise of 
her exclusive rights.45  If, by contrast, transient reproductions do have value, but are 
neither subsumed within the public performance right nor trigger the reproduction 
right, then ruling these copies outside the scope of copyright effectively attributes to 
Congress an intent to create a two-track system, in which authors would control 
markets for fixed copies and for public performances and displays of protected works, 
but in which third parties could exploit whatever reproduction markets they could 
develop for “unfixed” copies of those works.46  It is not likely that Congress would 
have anticipated such markets, and even less apparent what policies such a 
construction would advance.  Instead, where unauthorized transient copies do 
compromise the exercise of exclusive rights (as in Cablevision), it would follow that 
these copies constitute actionable “reproductions.”   
 
                                                 
44 See 17 USC sec. 115(d):  
A “digital phonorecord delivery” is each individual delivery of a phonorecord by digital 
transmission of a sound recording which results in a specifically identifiable reproduction by 
or for any transmission recipient of a phonorecord of that sound recording, regardless of 
whether the digital transmission is also a public performance of the sound recording or any 
nondramatic musical work embodied therein. 
45 CF. European Union, 2001 Information Society Directive, art. 5.1 (exempting transient copies having 
no independent economic significance), discussed infra Part II.A. 
 If there are different rightholders of the reproduction and public performance rights, then 
excluding transient copies that are ancillary to the public performance right can have an economic 
impact on the owners of the reproduction right.  Cf. text at notes 114-22, infra (impact on owners of the 
public performance right if downloading is characterized as only reproduction).  When the principal 
activity comes within the scope of copyright, the characterization of the ancillary transient copy as a 
“reproduction” goes to which rightholder gets compensated, rather than to whether compensation is 
owed at all. 
46 By contrast, Congress did allow the vestiges of “common law copyright” to persist, but only with 
respect to works (not copies) that had never been fixed.  See 17 U.S.C. sec. 301(b)(1).  The reason for 
the disparity in subject matter appears to be constitutional (Congress’ power under Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 8 
extends to “writings,” which may imply fixation), rather than economic.  See, e.g., Staff Members of 
the New York University Law Review Under the Guidance of Professor Walter J. Derenberg, Study 
No. 3:  The Meaning of “Writings” in the Copyright Clause of the Constitution (1956), reprinted in 1 
Studies on Copyright 43, 62-64 (Copyright Society of the U.S.A. ed., 1963) (courts have interpreted the 
constitutional requirement of “writings” to require fixation). 
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One might object that an approach focusing on economic significance is as 
absurd as the calculus of sufficient “duration” may be intractable: a transient copy 
becomes (or un-becomes) an actionable reproduction depending on whether the 
downstream activity comes within the copyright holder’s control (or compensation). 
Rather than seeking the correct characterization of the transient copy, it might make 
more sense to reassess whether the activity which the transient copies make possible 
is in fact infringing.  In Cablevision, for example, the characterization of the buffer 
copies that Cablevision made becomes important because the court - probably 
incorrectly - determined that Cablevision did not make the copies that served as the 
source of the time-shifted transmissions, and furthermore – and equally dubiously – 
held that those transmissions were not public performances.  That said, policy reasons 
may counsel concentrating on the intermediate copy when the end use can plausibly 
claim to be non infringing.  Where a commercial exploitation is at issue, if the 
intermediate copy is deemed too transient to trigger liability of its own accord, then 
one may anticipate an inclination to find an infringing act at the end of the chain.  But 
if the end user is an individual consumer rather than a commercial entity, we may 
sense some discomfort labeling her acts as infringement, particularly if she does them 
at home.  Yet we also recognize that copyright markets are increasingly consumer-
enabling.  It may be desirable to alleviate the ensuing pressure on the copyright 
system by focusing on the burgeoning businesses that transit copyrighted works to 
consumers.47 
  
2. Who makes the copy? 
 
In addition to the buffer copies, the Cablevision system included copies that 
indisputably were “fixed” on Cablevision’s servers.  As to these copies, however, 
Cablevision contended that their “makers” were not Cablevision, but Cablevision’s 
subscribers.  Thus any reproductions made on the system were not directly 
attributable to Cablevision (recall that the parties agreed not to litigate Cablevision’s 
potential indirect liability for the making of the copies).  The copyright owners 
claimed that, while the user requested the recording of a copy, Cablevision’s 
computers carried out the copying and the storage.  The Second Circuit ruled that 
because Cablevision’s actions were entirely automated they lacked the “volitional” 
character required of one who “actually ‘makes’ a copy.”48  The court distinguished 
prior cases holding photocopy shops liable for copies made at the request of users, on 
the ground that the human element of the shop employees supplied the necessary 
volitional conduct.49  Instead, the court likened Cablevision’s system to a copy shop 
in which the customers themselves made photocopies on store premises on machines 
supplied by the shop.  (The Court did not address whether a copy shop that also 
provided the works to be copied and retained the copies for the customers’ later 
retrieval might warrant different consideration.)  Merely supplying the means to copy 
is not enough; the copyright owners’ contentions would blur the line between direct 
                                                 
47 Some intermediaries implicated in the transmission of works to end users, however, enjoy 
conditional limitations on liability, see 17 USC sec 512(a) (mere conduit internet service providers); 
512(c) (host service providers).  
 See also text at note 56: in some instances the consumer’s digital copy might be “made” by 
both the consumer and the commercial intermediary; any fair use defense the consumer might advance 
would not necessarily pertain to the commercial intermediary. 
48 536 F.3d at 131. 
49 It is not apparent why the frequently mindless physical labor of undifferentiated photocopying injects 
greater agency into the process than deploying a computer program to do the task. 
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and contributory infringement, the court stressed.  In essence, the court found no 
substantive difference between supplying a free-standing recording device that a user 
operates at home and supplying a remote digital recording system that the user 
operates from home. 
 
The Second Circuit’s determination, that a business which establishes and 
manages an automated system that invites end users to request the making of copies 
which it stores for the users for subsequent communication to them lacks the agency 
sufficient for direct liability for infringement of the reproduction right, could herald 
the development of business models designed to elude copyright control over the 
exploitation of works, particularly in a technological environment in which pervasive 
automation is increasingly foreseeable.  The court’s concept of “volitional conduct” 
therefore deserves further consideration.  Because the court acknowledged that 
Cablevision set up and controlled the general framework and contents of its remote 
service, the court’s ruling turns on Cablevision’s absence of volition regarding the 
creation of copies of the particular programs its customers selected from among the 
programming generally offered by Cablevision.  Was the court correct that volitional 
conduct is required, and must correspond to the specific copy?  In the first instance, it 
is not clear that volition must always be a distinct element of the violation of the 
reproduction right.  The court’s principal authority for a volition requirement, 
Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communications Services,50 
concerned a “mere conduit” online service provider, who simply conveyed copies of 
works from one subscriber to another.  By contrast, Cablevision’s own transmissions 
are the source of the copies the subscribers request.  Second, the copy shop analogy 
does not track the conduct at issue nor convey the extent of the entrepreneur’s 
volition: one would have to imagine a copy shop engaged in a remote printing 
operation, in which the customer would select from the works in the copy shop’s 
inventory, and then transmit a request to print out the document; the copy shop in turn 
would automatically print out the document, charge the customer’s account, and store 
the printout for the customer’s pick-up.51  In this scheme, the entrepreneur arguably 
has demonstrated volition that any of its inventory be copied, even if it cannot be 
shown that any particular work be the object of any particular customer’s request at 
any particular time. 
 
In any event, copy shops, even copy shops with facilities for printing and 
storing the copies that customers make using the shop’s machines and inventory of 
works, may not capture the nature of a remote copying service.  A more pertinent 
analogy may be to document delivery services.  In the analog world, the customer 
would request a document, which the service would copy and send to the customer.  
Although the customer initiated the transaction and selected the work, the status of the 
service as the copy’s “maker” would have been clear.52  Does the transition to digital 
change the result, so that the document delivery service would now be subject at most 
to contributory liability for inciting the customer to use its automated service make a 
copy of the works it offers?  Like Cablevision, services such as Lexis “sell[] access to 
a system that automatically produces copies on command.”53  But, in New York Times 
                                                 
50 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
51 Thanks to Prof. Tony Reese for this analogy. 
52 See Ryan v Carl Corp. 23 F.Supp. 2d 1146 (ND Cal 1998). 
53 536 F.3d at 132. 
 16
v Tasini,54 the Supreme Court appears to have assumed that, when a customer 
requests a particular article that was published in the New York Times, Lexis, not the 
customer (or at least, not only the consumer), creates that copy from its database 
containing the full contents of the collective work.  In the statement of its holding, the 
Court declared, “the databases reproduce and distribute articles . . .”55  Moreover, 
when the defendants contended that the authors’ claim, properly conceived, advanced 
the derivative, rather than the direct, liability of the publishers, the court rejoined: 
“The Electronic Publishers, however, are not merely selling ‘equipment’; they are 
selling copies of the Articles.”56  Although the court did not spell out “selling copies 
that they made of the Articles,” the specification is implicit and follows from the 
Court’s earlier determination that Lexis was reproducing and distributing the 
freelance journalists’ articles.  The court thus did not conceptualize Lexis’ activities 
as selling its customers access to Lexis’ automated retrieval system in order that the 
customers might make copies of plaintiffs’ articles for themselves -- even though the 
customer’s computer, on receipt of the communication from Lexis, is embodying a 
copy in its temporary memory, so that perhaps both Lexis and the customer are 
reproducing the work.  (In Cablevision’s system, by contrast, the copy is embodied on 
the servers of Cablevision.)  Moreover, Lexis was “selling copies” of articles whose 
automatic generation would, under the Second Circuit’s analysis, have deprived Lexis 
of the requisite “volition” as to the identity of each article sold.   
Ultimately, for the Second Circuit, the controlling analogy was not document 
delivery, which the court did not in fact discuss, nor even photocopy shops, but 
VCRs.  One suspects that, underlying the court’s determination that the remote “time 
shifting” service did not “make” the copies it stored for users at their request, was an 
unstated conclusion regarding an issue the parties agreed not to litigate: whether the 
end users would be liable for copying the television programming.  Because the users’ 
were engaged in a higher-tech form of “time shifting,” and, under Sony, time shifting 
(at least of free broadcast television)57 is non infringing, then the higher-tech version 
must be non infringing, too.  That calculus may have informed the court’s assessment 
of “who” made the copy.  Suppose, instead, that Cablevision had been offering its 
customers access to programming that the customers were not otherwise entitled to 
view, for example because those customers formed an audience to which 
Cablevision’s cable or satellite distribution compulsory license did not extend.58  If 
Cablevision simply redirected the signal to those customers, it would be directly liable 
                                                 
54 533 U.S. 483 (2001). 
55 Id at 488. 
56 Id. at 504. 
57 The customers here were time shifting cable transmissions, which fall outside the stated scope of 
Sony. 
58 See 17 USC secs 111, 119 and 122. Sections 111 and 119 differentiate between local broadcasts and 
distant broadcasts.  Local broadcasts are those that can reach viewers in the area where the cable 
system or satellite is located without the use of a cable system or satellite, and distant broadcasts are 
those that viewers would not otherwise receive without the cable system or satellite because they are 
imported from distant broadcast stations.  Cable systems or satellites can retransmit local broadcasts 
without having to pay copyright license fees, but sections 111 and 119 establish a compulsory license 
scheme for distant broadcasts.  Section 119 defines the households and subscribers eligible to receive 
secondary transmissions from the satellite carrier, and sets out “violation[s] of territorial restrictions on 
statutory license for network stations.”  Section 122 allows a satellite carrier to make secondary 
transmissions into the television station’s local market, subject to a compulsory license.  The satellite 
carrier may not transmit the performance or display to a subscriber who does not reside in the 
originating television station’s local market, sec. 122(f). 
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for violating the copyright owners’ public performance rights.59  Suppose, instead, it 
split the signal so that the live feed went to authorized recipients, and the remaining 
feed went to a buffer and thence to the virtual storage boxes of the subscribers to the 
remote access service who requested particular programs.  The process just described 
is the same as in the actual Cablevision case, but one may wonder whether, in this 
version, the court still would have found that Cablevision lacked sufficient agency to 
be the “maker” of those storage copies. 
The court may have assumed that it ultimately will not matter who “makes” 
the copy if the business that “induced” the end-user to make the copy would in any 
event be liable as a contributory infringer (an issue the parties agreed not to litigate).60  
But if the end-user’s copy is not infringing, there will be no secondary liability.  
Arguably, if the end-user’s copying would be fair use, then assisting that copying 
should not be infringing either, whether the assistance comes in the form of enabling 
the end-user to do the copying herself, or instead doing the copying for the user.  But 
the caselaw is far from clear that copying on behalf of the user is fair use.61  For 
example, the decisions involving photocopy shops generally reject the proposition 
that the commercial photocopyist is in a sense subrogated to what might be 
educational fair use copying by the end-user.62  There are other scenarios of potential 
commercial significance which turn on the identification of who engages in the 
copyright-implicating act.  We will consider two of them in the context of the public 
performance right.63  With respect to the reproduction right, a transnational 
transposition of the facts points toward a disturbing quandary.  Suppose Cablevision 
were to offer its service to online customers located outside the U.S.  If the customers, 
not Cablevision, “make” the playback copies, then the acts of reproduction occur 
abroad (even though the copies reside on Cablevision’s U.S. servers).64  As 
extraterritorial acts, they are not governed by U.S. copyright law, and Cablevision 
would not be liable under U.S. law for contributory infringement of a foreign 
copyright law.65  Cablevision might be directly or contributorily liable under the laws 
of the countries of its customers’ residences, but those countries’ might consider that 
                                                 
59 See, e.g., Live Nation Motor Sports, Inc. v. Davis, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2196 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 
2007); NFL v PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 211 F.3d 10 (2000). 
60 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 923, 937-940 (2005) 
(finding that the users of defendants’ file-sharing software downloaded copyright files, but defendants 
were liable for contributory infringement because they induced infringement); A & M Records, Inc. v. 
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that Napster’s users violated 
plaintiffs’ right of reproduction, but Napster was liable as a contributory infringer because it knowingly 
induced the infringing activity).   
61 See generally, Joseph P. Liu, Enabling Copyright Consumers, 22 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 1099, 1099-
1100 (2007) (“courts quite frequently hold companies liable for helping consumers engage in activities 
that would be fair or non-infringing uses if undertaken  by consumers themselves.”). 
62 See, e.g., Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc., 99 F.3d 1381(6th 
Cir.1996); Los Angeles News Service v. Tullo 973 F.2d 791, 797 (9th Cir. 1992); Basic Books, Inc. v. 
Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F.Supp. 1522, 1531-1532  (S.D.N.Y.1991). 
63 Infra Part I.C.2 and 3. 
64 Arguably, the requisite U.S. point of attachment would be present if one conceptualized the operation 
as an extraterritorial act on the part of the non U.S. resident, who from abroad causes a copy to be made 
on a server located in the U.S.  Of course, Cablevision could also move its servers offshore.  
65 See, e.g., Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM–Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994); 
Illustro Systems International, LLC v. IBM, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33324, at *39 (N.D. Tex. May 4, 
2007).  Our hypothetical Cablevision’s subsequent transmission from the US to the foreign recipients 
might nonetheless violate the public performance right, see NFL v Primetime24, 211 F.3d 10 (2000), 
but not if, as per Cablevision, those transmissions are not “public” performances.  See infra part I.C. 
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the “maker” of the copies is Cablevision, whose acts of copying occur in the U.S., and 
which therefore are subject to U.S. law.66  
  
 
B. Distribution right 
 
Section 106(3) sets out the exclusive right “to distribute copies or 
phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of 
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.”  Several recent first-level decisions address 
whether this language extends not merely to distribution of digital files, but also to the 
“making available” of digital files, without proof that the offered files were in fact 
received.  While the distribution right’s coverage of digital as well as analog copies 
has withstood challenge, several decisions reject the existence of a “making available 
right.”  
 
1. Distribution of digital copies 
 
The defendants in the London-Sire case, pursuing their argument that a “copy” 
cannot be a digital file, urged a narrowing construction of the distribution right.  They 
contended that, according to the statute, “distribution” occurs only “by sale or other 
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.”  These are all forms of 
dissemination that presume physical copies, defendants claimed.  In particular, 
“transfer of ownership” necessarily implies that the person making the distribution 
gives up her copies when she distributes them to others.  If the alleged “distributor” 
never parts with possession of her copies, she cannot have transferred their ownership, 
defendants asserted.  In the context of digital files, however, the person who “sends” a 
copy in fact retains the copy in her computer, even as she causes the recipient’s 
computer to make another copy.  Because no copy “changes hands,” it should follow, 
according to the defendants, that there has been no distribution. 
 
The court declined to read “transfer of ownership” as requiring dispossession 
of the distributor’s copy.  
 
First, while the statute requires that distribution be of “material objects,” there 
is no reason to limit “distribution” to processes in which a material object 
exists throughout the entire transaction -- as opposed to a transaction in which 
a material object is created elsewhere at its finish. Second, while the statute 
addresses ownership, it is the newly minted ownership rights held by the 
transferee that concern it, not whether the transferor gives up his own.67   
 
                                                 
66 It might be possible to break out of this maddening circle by characterizing Cablevision’s acts as 
“making available” the programming to foreign end-users if the countries to whose consumers 
Cablevision offers the service localize the act of making available in the territories of the consumers’ 
residences.  If, however, those countries consider that the “making available” is occurring from the 
source country of the communication, rather than to the countries of receipt of the communication, 
then, under those countries’ analyses of private international law, U.S. law would apply.  See generally 
Jane Ginsburg, observations on TGI Paris, decision of May 20, 2008 (SAIF c Google), RDTI No. 33 p. 
501, 511-15 (Dec. 2008) (discussing French courts’ localization of transborder internet 
communications of works of authorship) 
67 542 F.Supp.2d at 173. 
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For the court, “transfer of ownership” thus includes creating ownership of a copy in 
the recipient; it does not require divestiture by the transferor.  Linguistically, this 
reading may at first blush seem somewhat strained, for “transfer” does commonly 
imply a change in ownership, rather than a multiplication of ownership.68  On the 
other hand, “transfer” in the phrase “file transfer” (as in “file transfer protocol” or 
“FTP”) is widely used to denote sending a digital file without necessarily (or ever) 
deleting the file from the sender’s computer.69  Moreover, both purposive 
interpretation and other textual evidence support the court’s determination.  With 
regard to Congress’ intent in specifying a distribution right, the court stated, “Read 
contextually, it is clear that this right was intended to allow the author to control the 
rate and terms at which copies or phonorecords of the work become available  to the 
public.  . . .  Clearly, § 106(3) addresses concerns for the market for copies or 
phonorecords of the copyrighted work . . .   What matters in the marketplace is not 
whether a material object ‘changes hands,’ but whether, when the transaction is 
completed, the distributee has a material object.70 The Court therefore concludes that 
electronic file transfers fit within the definition of ‘distribution’ of a phonorecord.”71  
 
The defendants’ argument implies that the right’s formulation, “to distribute 
copies . . . to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or 
lending” (emphasis supplied) evidences an intent to exclude any forms of distribution 
which do not occur by means of the modes listed.  In 1976, however, the list probably 
covered the means of distribution then envisioned; specifying that the right reached 
transfers both of ownership and of possession (rental, lease or lending) appears 
designed to reinforce the right’s comprehensiveness.72  It is therefore unlikely that 
Congress in 1976 intended “transfer of ownership” to have a limiting effect on the 
scope of the distribution right.  Congress did indeed establish limitations on the right’s 
scope, but it did so in a separate section announcing an explicit exception removing 
copies “lawfully made under this title” from the copyright owner’s control over their 
                                                 
68 The Merriam-Webster online dictionary’s first definition of the noun “transfer” is “conveyance of 
right, title, or interest in real or personal property from one person to another.”  See 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/transfer[2]. 
69 Other common uses of “transfer” that do not imply divestiture include Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
(HTTP), and Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP).  See “What is file transfer protocol,” 
http://searchnetworking.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid7_gci213976,00.html  A Google search 
reveals “about 20,500,000” results for “file transfer.” 
70 Taken out of context, the court’s end-up-with-a-copy test could be overbroad.  For example, if a 
home viewer records a television broadcast, thus creating a copy, has the broadcaster “distributed” the 
“copy” the viewer ended up with? (Thanks to Tony Reese for this example.)  Indeed, with 
contemporary recording media, any performance or display could result in “copies,” though, as a 
matter of common sense, it is doubtful that many of them would constitute “distributions.”  For 
example, if passers-by photograph  the wearer of a t-shirt emblazoned with copyrightable text or image, 
copies will result, but the wearer cannot reasonably be said to have distributed them.  For a distribution 
to take place, the exchange (or new creation) of a copy should be the object of the transaction.  
71 542 F.Supp.2d at 173-74. 
72Compare the 1909 Copyright Act, whose section 1 did not express a general right of distribution 
covering transfers of possession as well as of ownership: 
 Any person entitled thereto, upon complying with the provisions of this title, shall have the 
exclusive right: 
(a) To print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work; . . . 
(f) To reproduce and distribute to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by 
rental, lease, or lending, reproductions of the copyrighted work if it be a sound recording 
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subsequent disposition by the owner of the copy.73  The structure of the statute, 
articulating broad rights in section 106, and specific exceptions in the following 
sections,74 therefore argues against giving “transfer of ownership” a constraining 
interpretation.   
 
Moreover, subsequent legislation endorses the characterization of a transfer of 
a digital file as a form of “distribution.”  Congress in 1995 amended the section 115 
“compulsory license for making and distributing phonorecords” to include among the 
beneficiaries of the license “those who make phonorecords or digital phonorecord 
deliveries,” and further specifying, “A person may obtain a compulsory license only if 
his or her primary purpose in making phonorecords is to distribute them to the public 
for private use, including by means of a digital phonorecord delivery.”75  The 
definition of “digital phonorecord delivery” confirms that the constitution of the copy 
in the recipient’s computer is the key activity: “A ‘digital phonorecord delivery’ is 
each individual delivery of a phonorecord by digital transmission of a sound recording 
which results in a specifically identifiable reproduction by or for any transmission 
recipient of a phonorecord of that sound recording . . .”76  It is reasonable to assume 
that by 1995 Congress was aware that digital deliveries create new copies without 
divesting the sender’s copy; if Congress nonetheless equated “digital phonorecord 
delivery” with distribution, then “transfer of ownership” cannot, at least with respect 
to the distribution rights in musical works and sound recordings,77 have been 
understood to require dispossession of the transferor’s copy. 
 
The definition of “digital phonorecord delivery” also corresponds to the 
conduct involved in file-sharing.  When a participant in a file-sharing network obtains 
a copy (phonorecord) of a sound recording that she has located in another 
participant’s sharing folder, her acquisition occurs through a “digital transmission of a 
sound recording [from the hard drive of the participant who listed the recording as 
available for sharing] which results in a specifically identifiable reproduction by or for 
any transmission recipient of a phonorecord of that sound recording” on that 
recipient’s hard drive.  The completed transaction thus constitutes the digital 
distribution of a copy or phonorecord. 
 
2. “Making available” 
 
If section 106(3)’s coverage of digital distribution is well-settled, the same 
cannot be said of the “making available right.”  Extrapolating from the definition of 
“digital phonorecord delivery,” the statutory distribution right applies when a 
specifically identifiable reproduction “results in” the destination computer.  That 
implies that the delivery has actually been received, not merely offered.  Similarly, if 
                                                 
73 17 USC sec. 109(a) (codifying the “first sale doctrine”; in the EU this doctrine is known as 
“exhaustion of rights”). 
74 Section 106 states: “Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title has 
the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: . . .” 
75 Id. sec. 115(a)(1), as amended by the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, 
Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336. 
76 Id. sec. 115(d) (emphasis supplied). 
77 See S. Rep. No. 104-128 at 17 (1995) (legislative history of 1995 Act: adverting to uncertainty 
whether a “transmission can constitute a distribution of copies” and “express[ing] no [general] view on 
current law in this regard” but wanting to remove uncertainty “as to digital transmissions of recorded 
music”). 
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“transfer of ownership” has come to include creation of newly owned copies in the 
recipient’s computer, that may not be the same thing as merely inviting potential 
recipients to create those copies in their computers.   Thus, simply making the work 
available for copying may not fit within the literal scope of the right.78  Two appellate 
courts have stated in passing that persons who “post” files to a sharing directory79 or 
“upload file names” to a directory of files available for downloading80 violate 
copyright owners’ exclusive rights of distribution.  But these statements do not 
furnish strong authority for the proposition that the distribution right encompasses the 
making available without actual transfer of digital files.  In one instance, the 
defendant’s liability was based solely on having downloaded (reproduced) files; 
reference to liability for “posting” therefore was only dictum.  In the other case, the 
defendant, Napster, appears not to have contested that the activities of its users in 
uploading file names to the centralized directory were prima facie infringing of the 
distribution right.81 
 
The case law that specifically confronts the extension of the distribution right 
to acts only of “making available” online is currently all from first-level courts 
adjudicating claims brought by record or film producers against individuals allegedly 
engaged in high-volume file sharing, and is very inconsistent, but the more 
extensively reasoned decisions do not find statutory authority for a making available 
right as such.82  Nonetheless, some of the decisions have come to results consonant 
with a making available right, in particular, by equating the defendant’s conduct with 
“publication,” or, more persuasively, by announcing a presumption that works made 
available were in fact downloaded.  Other decisions, while rejecting the existence or 
approximation of a making available right, have pointed out that the person offering 
digital files from her sharing directory may still be pursued for violating the 
reproduction right if those files were themselves the fruits of illegal downloads or 
otherwise unlawfully copied. 
 
                                                 
78 See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, Goldstein on Copyright § 7.5.1 (3d ed. 2005) ("The crux of the distribution 
right lies in the transfer . . . of a copy or phonorecord . . . . [A]n actual transfer must take place; a mere 
offer of sale will not infringe the right.") 
79 BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 889 (7th Cir. 2005) (“people who post or download music 
files are primary infringers”). 
80 A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir 2001) (“Napster users who upload file 
names to the search index for others to copy violate plaintiffs' distribution rights.”) 
81 There is an appellate decision, Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199 
(4th Cir. 1997), which at first blush seems to endorse a making available right.  But it did not concern 
digital distribution and, more importantly, is best understood as announcing an evidentiary presumption 
of distribution rather than an exclusive right to offer copies to the public.  See discussion infra, text at 
notes 92-94 
82 There have been many default decisions accepting, without discussion, the inclusion of “making 
available” within the distribution right.  See, e.g., Universal City Studios Prods. LLLP v. Franklin, 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26190 (ND Ind. 2007) (downloading and posting are both infringing activities);  
Arista Records LLC v. Ibanez, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 691 (SD Cal 2008) (copyright infringement 
encompasses making available for distribution); Warner Bros. Records Inc. v. Tait, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 46034  (MD Fla. 2008) (same); Warner Bros. Entm't v. Bowers, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10356  
(NDNY 2007) (same); Disney Enters. v. Merchant, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10365 (NDNY 2007) 
(same).  But see Atl. Recording Corp. v. Brennan, 534 F. Supp. 2d 278, 281-82 (D. Conn. 2008) 
(denying a motion for default judgment and questioning the validity of a "making available" claim: 
"without actual distribution of copies . . . there is no violation [of] the distribution right." Citation 
omitted.). 
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In Elektra Entm't Group, Inc. v. Barker,83 the court found no persuasive 
authority for a “making available” right.84  Nonetheless, it observed that the Copyright 
Act does not define “distribute” or “distribution,” but that it did define a closely 
related term, “publication,” in terms “virtually identical” to Section 106(3)’s provision 
for a distribution right, but with additional specification: “The offering to distribute 
copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution, 
public performance, or public display, constitutes publication.”85  This language from 
1976 could unwittingly have anticipated peer-to-peer networks: the person who places 
a copy of a work in her sharing directory is offering it to “a group of persons” 
(internet users) “for the purpose of further distribution” (follow-on “sharing” by other 
participants in the peer-to-peer network).  The court therefore held that it would 
entertain a claim that the defendant offered to distribute digital files for the purpose of 
further distribution.86  The difference between this claim and a “making available” 
claim seems more semantic than substantive.  In any event, the court’s equation of 
distribution with publication is ultimately unconvincing.  It is true that “publication” 
is a form of distribution,87 but “publication,” properly understood, is not 
“synonymous”88 with “distribution.”  Rather, “publication” appears in two specific 
contexts, the first distribution of copies of the work to the public,89 and distributions 
of copies to which formalities apply.90  Thus, while all publications are distributions, 
not all distributions are publications.   
Like the Elektra v Barker court, the London-Sire court also did not discern a 
“making available” right in section 106(3), but neither did it subscribe to the 
“publication” theory.91  Instead, the court followed the analysis of a decision 
construing the distribution right in the analog world.  In Hotaling v. Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints,92 the authors alleged that the branch libraries of the 
Mormon Church had “made available” to the public unauthorized copies of their work 
on microfiche.  The libraries had not kept records showing whether patrons had in fact 
consulted the microfiches.  The Church therefore rejoined that the authors could show 
no more than an offer to distribute the work; without proof that a member of the 
                                                 
83 551 F. Supp. 2d 234 (SDNY 2008). 
84 Id. at 243-44. 
85 17 USC sec 101. 
86 The court also observed that other courts had recharacterized making available claims as allegations 
of unauthorized publication.  See 551 F.Supp.2d at 244, citing, inter alia, Atl. Recording Corp. v. 
Anderson, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53654 (SD Tex 2008). The Anderson court “equated” publication 
with distribution, and held “Defendant's actions in placing Plaintiffs' Copyrighted Recordings in a 
shared folder accessible to numerous other persons on KaZaA constituted a ‘distribution’ for the 
purposes of Plaintiffs' copyright infringement claim against Defendant.”  Id. at *18-20. 
87 See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 552 (1985). 
88 551 F.Supp.2d at 244. 
89 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 552 (Congress “recognized for the first time a distinct statutory right of 
first publication,” (emphasis supplied) quoting 1976 House Report, supra note 12, at 62 (“the right to 
control the first public distribution of an authorized copy”).  See also 17 U.S.C. secs, 407(a) (deposit 
for Library of Congress, “exclusive right of publication in a work published in the United States” – the 
context is first U.S. publication); 408(e)(“ Registration for the first published edition of a work 
previously registered in unpublished form”). 
90 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. secs. 401(a) (“Whenever a work protected under this title is published in the 
United States or elsewhere by authority of the copyright owner, a notice of copyright as provided by 
this section may be placed on publicly distributed copies . . .”); 403 (“publications incorporating United 
States Government works”).  
91 542 F.Supp.2d at 168-69. 
92 118 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 1997). 
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public accepted the offer, the authors could not make out their claim of unauthorized 
distribution.  The Fourth Circuit, sensitive to the impossible situation in which the 
Church’s argument placed the plaintiffs, shifted the onus of proof. 
  
   When a public library adds a work to its collection, lists the work in its 
index or catalog system, and makes the work available to the borrowing 
or browsing public, it has completed all the steps necessary for 
distribution to the public. At that point, members of the public can visit 
the library and use the work. Were this not to be considered distribution 
within the meaning of § 106(3), a copyright holder would be prejudiced 
by a library that does not keep records of public use, and the library 
would unjustly profit by its own omission.   . . .  If, as the Church says, 
actual use by the public must be shown to establish distribution, no one 
can expect a copyright holder to prove particular instances of use by the 
public when the proof is impossible to produce because the infringing 
library has not kept records of public use. To reiterate, a copyright holder 
should not be prejudiced in this manner, nor should an infringer benefit 
from its failure to keep records.93   
 
The court’s reasoning is not tantamount to extending the distribution right to an 
excusive right to make available to the public: while the offer itself would constitute 
the violation of a “making available” right, under the Hotaling reasoning, the person 
or entity alleged to have made a work available by “taking all the steps necessary for 
distribution” can rebut the charge of violating the distribution right by proving that no 
member of the public in fact accepted the offer.  In Hotaling, this allocation of the 
burden of proof seems perfectly fair: the library could have kept the records that 
would have allowed it to defeat the authors’ claim (of course, the records might also 
have substantiated that claim).  
The London-Sire court followed Hotaling to hold that  
where the defendant has completed all the necessary steps for a public 
distribution, a reasonable fact-finder may infer that the distribution actually 
took place. As in Hotaling, the defendants have completed the necessary 
steps for distribution, albeit electronic: Per the plaintiffs' pleadings, each 
individual Doe defendant connected to the peer-to-peer, network in such a 
way as to allow the public to make copies of the plaintiffs' copyrighted 
recordings. Through their investigator, the plaintiffs have produced evidence 
that the files were, in fact, available for download. They have also alleged 
that sound recordings are illegally copied on a large scale, supporting the 
inference that the defendants participated in the peer-to-peer network with 
the intent that other users could download from the defendants copies of the 
plaintiffs' copyrighted material.  . . .  The plaintiffs have alleged that each 
defendant shared many, many music files -- at least 100, and sometimes 
almost 700. As noted above, that evidence supports an inference that the 
defendants participated in the peer-to-peer network precisely to share 
copyrighted files. The evidence and allegations, taken together, are sufficient 
to allow a statistically reasonable inference that at least one copyrighted 
work was downloaded at least once. 94  
                                                 
93 Id. at 203-04. 
94 542 F.Supp.2d at 169, 176 (citations omitted). 
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 Like the Hotaling court, the London-Sire court announced its evidentiary 
presumption in reaction to the extreme difficulty the copyright owners would incur in 
endeavoring to prove the last step in the chain of distribution -- actual receipt by a 
member of the public.95  But where the libraries in Hotaling controlled their record-
keeping and thus could, at least in theory, rebut the presumption of distribution, it is 
less clear whether the peer-to-peer network in which the London-Sire defendants 
participated allowed for tracking actual downloads from sharing folders.  At least, the 
court did not advert to any tracking capabilities.  On the other hand, the network’s 
possible lack of provision for such record-keeping may be part of the point: where the 
intent to distribute is reasonably inferred from participation in a peer-to-peer network, 
and, given the volume of files made available, the likelihood of actual distribution is 
high, it would be unfair were the participants able to frustrate the infringement claim 
by ensuring the absence of a “counter” on the uploads.96 
 
 By contrast, Capitol Records v Thomas97 rejected both a “making available” 
right and any functional equivalents.   The court found no textual support in the 
Copyright Act for basing liability on a mere offer to distribute; far from finding the 
“distribution” synonymous with “publication,” the court inferred from the separate 
specification of “publication” a Congressional intent that the terms have different 
meanings.98  Moreover, the court determined that a prior decision from the controlling 
Circuit court had already ruled (in a non digital context) that distribution required 
“actual dissemination.”99  The court interpreted this ruling to bar the “deemed 
distribution” approach of Hotaling.  That said, the court suggested that  
The specter of impossible-to-meet evidentiary standards . . . is overstated. A 
person who makes an unauthorized copy or phonorecord of a copyrighted 
work for the purposes of uploading it onto a peer-to-peer network, absent a 
defense such as fair use, violates the reproduction right. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1). 
That person might also be liable for indirect infringement to the extent that her 
conduct caused others to engage in unauthorized reproduction, adaptation, 
                                                 
95 In the suits brought against individual peer-to-peer file sharers, copyright holders have engaged 
private investigators from a company called MediaSentry to discover potentially infringing transfers.  
Defendants have argued that “MediaSentry's own downloads are not themselves copyright 
infringements because it is acting as an agent of the copyright holder, and copyright holders cannot 
infringe their own rights.”  London-Sire, .542 F.Supp.2d at at 166.  The London-Sire court concluded 
that it did not need to resolve this issue.  Id. at 166 n.17.  Other courts have offered a variety of 
responses to the contention that private investigators’ downloads do not suffice to prove actual 
distribution of infringing files.  See, e.g. Olan Mills, Inc. v. Linn Photo Co., 23 F.3d 1345, 1347-1348 
(8th Cir. 1994 (rejecting defendant’s argument under agency theory that because plaintiff authorized its 
investigator to seek reproductions of the photographs in question, plaintiff licensed defendant to make 
copies of the protected works); Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F.Supp.2d 976, 985 (D. Ariz. 
2008) (holding that copies obtained by plaintiffs’ investigator are unauthorized); Higgens v. Detroit 
Educational Television Foundation, 4 F.Supp.2d 701 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (copyright owner cannot prove 
actual damages if infringing copies were sold only to the owner’s agent).   
96 See, e.g., Warner Bros. Records, Inc. v Payne, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65765, at *3 ("[T]he same 
evidentiary concerns that were present in Hotaling are also present in a case involving peer-to-peer file 
sharing programs.  'Piracy typically takes place behind closed doors and beyond the watchful eyes of a 
copyright holder.'") (citations omitted). 
97 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84155 (D. Minn. 2008). 
98 Id at *26.  Accord, Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 985 (D. Ariz. 2008). 
99 National Car Rental System, Inc. v. Computer Associates International, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 434 (8th 
Cir. 1993) 
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public distribution, public performance, or public display of another's 
copyrighted work.100   
 
In sum, most of the courts which have explicitly confronted the question have 
declined to interpret the section 106(3) distribution right to include a making available 
right.  In rejecting that right, some of the decisions acknowledge that their holdings 
may be inconsistent with the United States’ representation, in ratifying the 1996 
WIPO Copyright Treaties without amending the Copyright Act to add a “making 
available” right, that US law already covered that right, notably through the 
distribution right.101  We will consider the courts’ disinclination to interpret the US 
Copyright Act harmoniously with US international obligations in Part II.  
 
 
C. Public performance and display rights 
Section 106(4) and (5) confer the exclusive rights to publicly perform and 
publicly display certain copyrighted works.102  Digital media have called into question 
the meaning of both “public” and “perform,” as well as “who” engages in a 
performance or display. 
1.  Public performance or display 
Public performances or displays can occur in public places, or by transmission.  
The latter is relevant to digital exploitations.  The Act defines public performance or 
display by transmission: 
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the 
work . . . to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members 
of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the 
same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times. 
The definition was broadly-written, anticipating new forms of transmissions, notably 
video on demand.103  The plaintiffs in Cablevision contended that the statutory 
language covered the remote video delivery service.  The Second Circuit, however, 
having truncated the scope of the reproduction right in the digital environment, went 
on to announce a similarly constricted construction of the public performance right.  
Recall that the Cablevision remote play-back system stored copies of television 
programming in virtual storage boxes dedicated to individual subscribers.  When the 
subscriber chose to view the program, Cablevision would transmit it to her, using the 
copy in the subscriber’s storage box as the source of the transmission.  Cablevision 
therefore asserted that the transmission was not “to the public” because each copy was 
transmitted only to the particular subscriber.  The Second Circuit agreed, focusing on 
“who precisely is ‘capable of receiving’ a particular transmission of a performance.  . 
. . [The definition] speaks of people capable of receiving a particular ‘transmission’ or 
                                                 
100 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84155 at *40. 
101 See, e.g., Capitol Records, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84155 at *41-44; Elektra v. Barker, 551 
F.Supp.2d at 243 n.7. 
102 Sound recordings do not enjoy full public performance rights; section 106(6) provides for a digital 
public performance right further detailed in section 114. 
103 1976 House Report, supra note 12, at 64-65. 
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‘performance,’ and not of the potential audience of a particular ‘work.’”104  Because 
Cablevision had set up the playback system so that only one person (or her family or 
circle of social acquaintance – the statutory non “public”105) would be “capable” of 
receiving the transmission that originates from her storage box, the performance was 
not “public,” the court ruled. 
 
 The court’s parsing of the text of the Copyright Act is peculiar if not perverse.  
The key phrase in the definition is “to the public.”  “The public” in the case of a 
television transmission is the intended audience, or, in the case of a cable service, the 
subscribers.  The phrase “members of the public capable of receiving the 
performance” is not intended to narrow the universe of “the public.”  On the contrary, 
its role is to clarify that a transmission is still “to the public” even if its receipt is 
individualized.106  The “members of the public capable of receiving the performance” 
do not stop being “members of the public” just because they are “capable of receiving 
the performance” one at a time.  By the same token, it should not matter whether “the 
performance” originates from a single source copy repeatedly transmitted to 
individual members of the public “in different places at different times,”107 or from 
multiple copies each corresponding to a particular place and/or time.  The court’s 
declaration “that when Congress speaks of transmitting a performance to the public, it 
refers to the performance created by the act of transmission,”108 demonstrates that the 
court confused “performance” and “transmission.”  The statute does not refer to the 
performance created by the act of transmission.  The transmission does not itself 
“perform” (as in “play” or “render”109) the work; it communicates a work so that its 
performance will be perceived as the member of the public receives the 
communication.110  The court’s construction clashes with the text of the Act in 
another important way as well: it is not possible to transmit a performance “created by 
the act of transmission” to members of the public “at different times.”  While such a 
“performance” could be transmitted simultaneously to differently located recipients, 
recipients differently situated in time cannot receive the same transmission.111  The 
court’s interpretation thus reads non simultaneous receipt out of the statute.  As a 
result, Cablevision’s potential impact on the scope of the public performance right 
stretches beyond scenarios in which the transmission entity invites subscribers to 
make individual copies for subsequent individual transmission to them from its server.  
If the “performance” does not occur “publicly” because its transmission is 
individualized (only one member of the public is “capable of receiving” the particular 
transmission that she requests), then the decision’s rationale reaches even 
conventional on-demand streaming operations.  Because the Act explicitly covers 
                                                 
104 536 F.3d at 135. 
105 See 17 USC sec 101 (first part of the definition of public performance: in a “place open to the public 
or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its 
social acquaintances is gathered”). 
106 1976 House Report, supra note 12Error! Bookmark not defined., at 64-65. 
107 See On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, 777 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 
1991)(videocassette machine transmitted individualized showings of the same cassette to different 
hotel guestrooms at different times: held a public performance) 
108 536 F.3d at 136. 
109 See 17 USC sec 101 (definition of “perform”). 
110 For further development of the difference between transmission and performance, see discussion of 
United States v ASCAP (in re America Online), infra, notes 114-22. 
111 Thanks very much to David Carson for this observation. 
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performances that are transmitted to members of the public who are separated in time, 
however, the Second Circuit’s statutory construction cannot be correct.   
 
 The following scenario may help illustrate some additional bizarre 
consequences of the court’s problematic interpretations of the section 106(1) and (4) 
exclusive rights.  Recall the hypothetical variation on the Cablevision service, in 
which Cablevision would offer its subscribers individualized storage boxes of 
programming that Cablevision is not licensed to deliver, even by means of real time 
transmissions.112  Under the Second Circuit’s reasoning, Cablevision would not 
“make” the storage copies, and the copies it made by deviating the signal to the 
storage boxes through the buffer would not be actionable “copies.”  Finally, the 
transmissions Cablevision would make to its subscribers would not be “public” 
because there is only one member of the public “capable” of receiving each 
“performance.”  Although “the public” receives unauthorized transmissions, at no step 
of the way would an exclusive right be infringed.  In fact, the court seems to have 
recognized the precarious ground its analyses stake out, for, like King Canute trying 
to hold back the tide, the court foresaw the potential onslaught of new copyright-
avoiding business models that its decision might inspire, and proclaimed “This 
holding, we must emphasize, does not generally permit content delivery networks to 
avoid all copyright liability by making copies of each item of content and associating 
one unique copy with each subscriber to the network, or by giving their subscribers 
the capacity to make their own individual copies. We do not address whether such a 
network operator would be able to escape any other form of copyright liability, such 
as liability for unauthorized reproductions or liability for contributory 
infringement.”113  As the analyses of the statutory term “to perform,” and of the 
question of who performs or displays a work will show, however, Cablevision’s 
potential for eviscerating the public performance right may be even greater than the 
Second Circuit’s pious wish portends. 
 
2. To “perform” 
 
Digital media blur the boundary between reproduction and public performance 
because digital transmissions implicate the communication of transitory copies 
between the point of origin of the transmission and its receipt in individual end-user 
computers.  As we have already seen, the characterization of those copies as “copies” 
for purposes of the reproduction right is currently uncertain.  But if every digital 
transmission were potentially a distribution of copies, would it also be true that every 
distribution of digital copies can also be a public performance by transmission?   Put 
another way, if digital “streaming” might entail at least temporary “downloads” of 
copies, does every download implicate a public performance by transmission?  In US 
v ASCAP (In re America Online),114 the federal court which reviews the rates ASCAP 
proposes for various kinds of exploitations of the public performance right in non 
dramatic musical compositions, sought to determine a reasonable fee for the use of 
ASCAP-represented songs by several online services. The uses included both 
streaming and downloading; the court ruled that “the downloading of a digital music 
                                                 
112 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
113 536 F.3d at 139-140. 
114 485 F. Supp. 2d 438 (SDNY 2007). 
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file embodying a particular song [does not] constitute[] a ‘public performance’ of that 
song within the meaning the United States Copyright Act.”115 
 
 The Copyright Act defines “to perform a work” as “to recite, render, play, 
dance, or act it, either directly or by means of any device or process . . .”   Construing 
this language, the court held that “in order for a song to be performed, it must be 
transmitted in a manner designed for contemporaneous perception.”  As a result, a 
download would not be a performance: “Although we acknowledge that the term 
"perform" should be broadly construed, we can conceive of no construction that 
extends it to the copying of a digital file from one computer to another in the absence 
of any perceptible rendition. Rather, the downloading of a music file is more 
accurately characterized as a method of reproducing that file.”116  For the court, the 
two paradigms were “data transmissions” (which come within the reproduction and 
distribution rights) and “musical broadcasts” (which come within the public 
performance right).117  The transmission of a work that is being “rendered” or 
“played” while it is being communicated to the end user is like a broadcast; the 
communication of an inert file is like sending a CD.  Although the recipient will play 
the work after she receives it, that performance (which will generally not be a 
“public” one) is not attributable to the supplier of the CD.118 
 
The requirement that, to be “performed” by transmission, the work must be 
“transmitted in a manner designed for contemporaneous perception” is consistent with 
the statutory definition of “to perform.”119  Nonetheless, the distinction between 
transmissions “designed for contemporaneous perception” and those designed for 
subsequent perception may not fully correspond to the spectrum of online 
communications of works that are performed or displayed.  The distinction does 
reflect the extremes of the spectrum: downloads of songs, for example, from iTunes 
(reproduction), and webcasting, in which songs are “playing” on a website to which 
users can connect (public performance).  The “contemporaneous perception” 
characterization also seems to fit audio and video on demand that the user receives in 
“real time.”  But “real time” can in fact be elusive.  Suppose, for example, that the 
user connects to an online music service in order to listen immediately to the songs 
she selects.  The music starts to play, but then the user chooses to “pause” the 
performance for a few minutes, or perhaps hours.  When she hits “play” again, the 
music resumes, but, depending on how the service works, the music might be 
“coming from” the server of the online service, or it may be emanating from the 
user’s own computer, having been “sent” to her computer when she requested to hear 
                                                 
115 Id. at 441. 
116 Id. at 444-45. 
117 See id. at 446. 
118 Id.  “[T]he mere fact that a customer's online purchase is conveyed to him in a piecemeal manner, 
each segment of which is capable of playback as soon as the transmission is completed, does not 
change the fact that the transaction is a data transmission rather than a musical broadcast. Surely 
ASCAP would not contend that if a retail purchaser of musical records begins audibly playing each 
tape or disc as soon as he receives it the vendor is engaging in a public performance.” (emphasis in 
original). 
119 Accord, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE 
REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 226, note 536 (1995) 
(emphasis added).: “If a copy of a motion picture is transmitted to a computer's memory, for instance, 
and in the process, the sounds are capable of being heard and the images viewed as they are received 
in memory, then the public performance right may well be implicated as well.  See 17 U.S.C. § 101 
(1988) (definition of "perform").”  
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the song.  If one takes “contemporaneous perception” at face value, perhaps only the 
first transmission is a “performance” of the music.  But it is problematic for the 
characterization of the exploitation to turn on what happens once the user pushes the 
pause button.  The characterization matters because, in the U.S., different entities own 
the reproduction and distribution rights in musical compositions (generally, music 
publishers) on the one hand, and the public performance rights (performing rights 
societies, such as ASCAP and BMI) on the other.120  The court appears to have 
anticipated this concern, because it acknowledged: “We do not mean to foreclose the 
possibility, however, that a transmission might, under certain circumstances, 
constitute both a stream and a download, each of which implicates a different right of 
the copyright holder.”121 
 
The court’s reservation of the possibility that some transmissions may be 
hybrids calling into play both the reproduction and public performance rights may be 
pertinent to some other exploitations on the spectrum between “data transmissions” 
and “music broadcasts.”  If there is no “performance” unless the work is “played” 
either at the point of origin, or at the moment of receipt, then similar communications 
may be classified as performances (or not) solely on the basis of the technology of the 
transmission.  For example, suppose on the one hand, a conditional download-on-
demand scheme that sends the file during low traffic hours, and allows the consumer 
to listen once to the work at the time chosen by her.  The transmission will “feel” like 
a “broadcast,” but it is technically a “data transmission” because the music file will 
have been sitting inertly in the computer during the time between the actual 
transmission, say 4:00 AM, and the time the user told the service she wanted to hear 
the song, say, 4:00 PM.  Suppose on the other hand that the work is being both 
broadcast and simultaneously streamed to the user’s set-top box, which records the 
work as it is being transmitted; the consumer views the recorded transmission at a 
later date.  Under the “designed for contemporaneous perception” test, the streaming 
is a public performance because the streaming was “designed” for contemporaneous 
perception, even though only the set-top box was home to perceive it.  The 
consumer’s subsequent private viewing, albeit consciously not contemporaneous with 
the initial communication, does not detract from the characterization of the initial 
communication as a public performance.122  Because the court stopped short of 
imposing an “either/or” characterization of the exploitation, it left room for future 
adjudications to interpret the scope of the rights flexibly to address the full range of 
economic interests at stake.   
 
                                                 
120 Performing rights organizations share licensing revenue equally between publishers and authors; 
authors’ share of publishing royalties traditionally was considerably less than 50%. See Jill A. Michael, 
Music Copublishing and the Mysterious “Writer’s Share,” 20 Ent. & Sports Law. 13, 14-15 (2002).  
Where the same entity owns both the reproduction and the public performance rights, the 
characterization of a download as a reproduction only, or as also a public performance, has little 
practical impact on the negotiation of a price for the transmission, however characterized.  See, e.g., R. 
Anthony Reese, Copyright and Internet Music Transmissions: Existing Law, Major Controversies, 
Possible Solutions, 55 U. Miami L. Rev. 237, 263-64 (2001). 
121 485 F.Supp.2d at 446 n.5. 
122 The examples do not undermine the court’s reasoning; on the contrary they point up the difference 
between a right of “public performance” and the broader right of “communication to the public” set out 
in the Berne Convention and WIPO Copyright Treaties. See Berne Convention, arts. 11bis; WIPO 
Copyright Treat art. 8.  Compare Berne Conv., art 11(1), composers’ right to authorize “any 
communication to the public of the performance of their works” (emphasis supplied) 
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3. Who performs or displays? 
 
The examples just discussed posit transmissions (whether of “data” or of 
“performances”) that are made by the online service.  But the transmissions might be 
structured in a way that attributes them to the user rather than to the service.  In 
Cablevision the defendant argued that the “playback” function on the “remote VCR” 
was carried out by the user, rather than by Cablevision, who had merely set up the 
automated function, leaving it up to subscribers to execute the transmission.  The 
district court rejected this argument for the same reasons it ruled that Cablevision, not 
its subscribers, “made” the copies that were stored on Cablevision’s servers.123  The 
Second Circuit did not address this contention, instead ruling that the transmissions 
were not “public” because the transmissions emanated from source copies unique to 
each subscriber.124  But if the fully automated nature of Cablevision’s service 
deprived it of the “volition” as to specific content necessary to have “made” the 
source copies, as the Second Circuit held, it is difficult to see how that same 
automation would allow for any greater “volition” in the communication of the 
particular stored performances.  As a result, only the individual subscribers would be 
“performing” the work by requesting its transmission to their television sets.  
 
There are important practical consequences to the determination of who 
performs the work.  An online service, such as Cablevision, might be liable for 
indirect violations of the reproduction right, for inciting its subscribers to make 
unlawful copies of the television programming (assuming those copies would in fact 
be deemed infringing – a determination the parties’ agreement spared the Cablevision 
court).125  By contrast, if the subscribers, rather than the service, are deemed to effect 
the transmissions, then the service will not be contributorily liable for infringing the 
public performance right, because there will be no predicate violation of that right by 
the end users.  The end users will not be infringers, because their individualized 
transmissions would not be “to the public.” When, as in the U.S., different persons 
own the reproduction and public performance rights,126 a business model built around 
Cablevision’s implications for the public performance right will deprive the owners of 
the performance rights of control over or compensation for the transmissions.  
 
A different technological configuration, framing of websites, has given rise to 
another controversy regarding “who” engages in a copyright-implicating act.  In 
Perfect 10 v Amazon.com,127 the plaintiff publisher of “adult” print and online 
magazines, claimed that Google violated its exclusive right to publicly display its 
copyrighted photographs.  When a user employs the Google search engine to locate 
photographs, Google will display thumbnail images that respond to the search query.  
If the user clicks on one of those images, he will be directed to the website on which 
the photograph is stored, but will perceive the full-size image (in the context of the 
webpage on which it appears) through the frame of the Google website.  As a result of 
this “in-line framing” the user will experience the display as if it were emanating from 
Google, but in fact the image will be residing on a third party computer.  The Ninth 
                                                 
123 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Systems Corp., 478 F.Supp.2d 607, 622 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
124 536 F.3d at 139. 
125 Id. at 130 (referring to the possibility of secondary liability). 
126 See supra note 120 
127 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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Circuit, endorsing the “server theory” of public display, held that Google publicly 
displayed the thumbnails, which were stored on Google’s servers, but not the full-size 
images, which were stored on other computers:   
 
a person displays a photographic image by using a computer to fill a computer 
screen with a copy of the photographic image fixed in the computer's memory. 
There is no dispute that Google's computers store thumbnail versions of 
Perfect 10's copyrighted images and communicate copies of those thumbnails 
to Google's users. Therefore, Perfect 10 has made a prima facie case that 
Google's communication of its stored thumbnail images directly infringes 
Perfect 10's display right. 
 
Google does not, however, display a copy of full-size infringing 
photographic images for purposes of the Copyright Act when Google frames 
in-line linked images that appear on a user's computer screen. Because 
Google's computers do not store the photographic images, Google does not 
have a copy of the images for purposes of the Copyright Act. In other words, 
Google does not have any "material objects . . . in which a work is fixed . . . 
and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated" and thus cannot communicate a copy.  . . . While in-line 
linking and framing may cause some computer users to believe they are 
viewing a single Google webpage, the Copyright Act, unlike the Trademark 
Act, does not protect a copyright holder against acts that cause consumer 
confusion.128 
 
Although the court dismissed the claim that Google’s framing directly violated 
Perfect10’s display rights, it allowed Perfect10 to pursue a contributory infringement 
claim arising out of the same facts.129   
  
If Google, and others who frame or otherwise structure their websites to 
include pass-throughs to content located on third party websites are not “displaying” 
or “performing” the content because the content does not originate with them, perhaps 
their activities might be considered a “distribution” of that content by causing it to be 
accessed and at least temporarily copied by the end users.130  The requisite receipt 
appears to be implicit in this context: if the user clicks on the image, or the icon, or 
other pointer, she will see and/or hear the signaled content.  As we have seen, 
“distribution” does not require that the distributor yield up her copy; it suffices if she 
causes a copy to appear in the recipient’s memory.131 But the causation approach 
probably assumes that the person engaging in the distribution be the source of the 
recipient’s copy, even if she does not divest herself of her own copy.  Google’s frame 
may bring the recipient and the distributor together, but the copy does not originate 
with Google, nor does it transit through Google’s servers on its way from the source 
website to the recipient.   
 
                                                 
128 Id. at 1160-61. 
129 Id. at 1170-73.   
130 The temporary copies in this instance are likely to last longer than the 1.2 seconds the Cablevision 
court deemed too brief to be “fixed.”  That court did not indicate how many more seconds – or minutes 
- would be required for a “fixation.” 
131 See supra text at notes 67-76. 
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Actors who frame source websites or who aggregate links to source websites, 
or who offer access to digital files (without necessarily concluding the proposed 
transaction by sending the file or streaming its contents to the end user) may be 
engaged in making the works available to end-users.132  “Making available” is an 
activity of increasing economic importance, but the exclusive rights set out in the U.S. 
copyright act may not fully cover the conduct at issue.  In Part II.B. we will consider 
the international and comparative law aspects of the “making available” right and 
their relevance, if any, to interpretation of the scope of U.S. copyright.     
 
D. Moral Rights 
 
While several recent decisions articulate a cramped scope of exclusive 
economic rights, one appellate decision offers some encouragement regarding the 
enforceability of authors’ moral interests in attribution and integrity of their works.  In 
Jacobsen v Katzer,133 the plaintiff author distributed his software program under an 
open source “artistic license.”  The license allowed users to copy, modify and further 
distribute the software, but required, among other things, that the user “insert a 
prominent notice in each changed file stating how and when [the user] changed that 
file.”134  The defendant modified and redistributed the software, but without 
disclosing or attributing the changes.  The author sought an injunction compelling 
compliance with the terms of the license.  The district court held the user liable for 
breach of contract, but not for copyright infringement: the attribution obligation was a 
mere contractual “covenant” whose breach could be remedied in damages only.  
Because the copyright act does not confer attribution rights, the district court held, the 
author could not convert a breach of a contractual attribution obligation into a 
violation of the copyright for which the author could obtain injunctive relief.  The 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed. 
 
The appellate court characterized the Artistic License as imposing conditions 
on the copyright license.  Without the license, the defendant would be an infringer; if 
the defendant copies, alters, and distributes the work without complying with the 
conditions, the defendant is also an infringer against whom an injunction may be 
awarded. 
 
Copyright holders who engage in open source licensing have the right to 
control the modification and distribution of copyrighted material. . . .  
Copyright licenses are designed to support the right to exclude; money 
damages alone do not support or enforce that right. The choice to exact 
consideration in the form of compliance with the open source requirements of 
disclosure and explanation of changes, rather than as a dollar-denominated fee, 
is entitled to no less legal recognition. Indeed, because a calculation of 
damages is inherently speculative, these types of license restrictions might 
                                                 
132 Compare IFPI Denmark v. DMT2 A/S – Frederiksberg Fogedrets Kendelse, 5 Februaray 2008 – FS 
14324/2007 (finding “The Pirate Bay” website aggregating links to unauthorized sources of sound 
recordings and audiovisual works, liable for “making available”), with Universal v Cooper (2006) 156 
F.C.R. 380, holding that Australian aggregator of links to unauthorized MP3 sites violated copyright 
owners’ exclusive rights “to authorize” communication to the public of their works under section 
85(1)(c) of the Australian Copyright Act.  
133 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
134 Id at 1380. 
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well be rendered meaningless absent the ability to enforce through injunctive 
relief.135 
   
There are obvious personal reputational objectives underlying the attribution and 
modification disclosure requirements: to recognize the author’s name in connection 
with his work, and to ensure that another author’s work (and its potential deficiencies) 
not be attributed to the first author.  The court’s explanation of the importance of 
compliance with the conditions of the copyright license portrays those objectives 
through the lens of  economic value: 
 
The clear language of the Artistic License creates conditions to protect the 
economic rights at issue in the granting of a public license. These conditions 
govern the rights to modify and distribute the computer programs and files 
included in the downloadable software package. The attribution and 
modification transparency requirements directly serve to drive traffic to the 
open source incubation page and to inform downstream users of the project, 
which is a significant economic goal of the copyright holder that the law will 
enforce.136 
 
Perhaps this patrimonialized version of moral rights is the best one may expect from a 
U.S. court.137  Whatever the rationale, by upholding the enforceability of these online 
license terms, the decision may provide authors – at least those authors who distribute 
their work under “viral” licenses such as the General Public License for software, or 
Creative Commons licenses for other works in digital form138 -- with effective 
protection for their interests in attribution and integrity.  Because these licenses do not 
include a mechanism for authors to be paid, however, they will not assist authors who 
also seek a “dollar-denominated fee” for their work. 
 
II  Compliance with International Norms  
 
 The narrow(ed) scope of the reproduction, distribution and public performance 
rights expressed in some of the recent US decisions raises questions regarding their 
consistency with international norms.  We will consider whether Cablevision’s 
exclusion of transitory copies conforms to the scope of the reproduction right set out 
in article 9(1) of the Berne Convention (A), and whether Cablevision and the 
decisions on the scope of the distribution right place the US out of compliance with 
                                                 
135 Id. at 1382. 
136 Id. 
137 See, e.g., Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 Harv. Int’l L.J. 353, 381-391 (2006) 
(describing common law alternatives to moral rights, such as contract and tort).; Jane C. Ginsburg, 
Moral Rights in a Common Law System, 1 Ent. L. Rev. 121 (1990) (proposing adaptation of moral 
rights rhetoric to conform to coomonlaw rationales for copyright); Roberta Rosenthal Kwell, 
Copyright and the Moral Right:  Is an American Marriage Possible?, 38 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 17-18 (1985) 
(describing noncopyright alternatives to moral rights in the United States, which include unfair 
competition, breach of contract, defamation, and invasion of privacy). 
138 The Creative Commons licenses allow authors to distribute their work online to the public subject to 
conditions the author chooses, including requiring attribution and prohibiting alterations to the work.  
See Creative Commons, http://creativecommons.org/license/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2008) 
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the obligation in the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaties to cover the individualized 
“making available” of works of authorship (B).139 
 
A. Reproduction “in any manner or form” 
 
 Article 9(1) of the 1971 Paris text of the Berne Convention obliges member 
States to protect authors’ right of “reproduction of their works, in any manner or 
form.”  While “form” implies a material fixation, it is not clear whether the Berne 
Convention also imposes a requirement that the fixation endure for any period of 
time: “It is open to debate whether the Berne Convention also requires member States 
to interpret ‘any manner or form’ to extend to transient digital fixations.”140  The 
debates over the inclusion of a more digital-explicit reproduction right in the 1996 
WIPO Copyright Treaty further obscured, rather than clarified, the transient copy 
problem. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, Reports of the WIPO Committee of 
Experts addressed the need for clarifying the scope of the art. 9(1) reproduction 
right,141 ultimately supporting the EU and its Member States’ proposal to confirm in 
the records of the Diplomatic Conference or in the General Report, rather than in the 
text of the new treaty, that permanent or temporary storage of a protected work in any 
electronic medium comes within the meaning of reproduction in Article 9(1).142  
Whether the application of the reproduction right not only to temporary but also to 
transient computer retention of digital files was a matter merely to be “confirmed” or 
“clarified” in this way, or instead represented an extension of the scope of the right, 
was widely discussed in commentaries, and proved to be a highly contentious issue in 
the drafting of the 1996 WCT.143 
 
 Ultimately, the delegates were unable to propose an acceptable treaty article 
“clarifying” the scope of the reproduction right; instead they offered an “Agreed 
statement”: 
 
The reproduction right as set out in Article 9 of the Berne Convention, and the 
exceptions permitted thereunder, fully apply in the digital environment, in 
particular to the use of works in digital form.  It is understood that the storage of 
a protected work in digital form in an electronic medium constitutes a 
reproduction within the meaning of Article 9 of the Berne Convention. 
 
 Whether or not the Berne Convention already embraced all kinds of 
reproductions, including the temporary and the transient, the significant contribution 
of the first sentence of the Agreed Statement appears to be its emphasis on exceptions 
                                                 
139 See WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) art. 8; WIPO Performers and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) arts. 
10, 14. 
140 See Sam Ricketson and Jane C Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The 
Berne Convention and Beyond ¶ 11.27 (2006). 
141 See, e.g., Report of the Second WIPO/UNESCO Committee of Governmental Experts on Copyright 
Problems Arising from the Use of Computers for Access to or the Creation of Works, Copyright 1982, 
pages 239 et seq., 245 et seq. (acknowledging that computer storage and retrieval of works may 
implicate the reproduction right protected by the Berne and Universal Copyright Conventions). 
142 WIPO Report on the Second Session of the Committee of Experts on a Possible Protocol to the 
Berne Convention, Copyright 1992 p. 93, paras. 48-57. 
143 For an account of the attempts to draft an article addressing the reproduction right, see, e.g., Silke 
von Lewinski, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND POLICY ¶¶ 17.52-17.55 (2008); Ricketson and 
Ginsburg, supra note 140 at ¶¶ 11.69-11.74 and works cited therein.   
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to the reproduction right, rather than its, possibly meaningless, announcement that the 
reproduction right “fully appl[ies]” in the digital environment.  Arguably, the “full 
application” of the reproduction right in the digital environment should entail all 
forms of reproduction, however short-lived.144  But the second sentence of the Agreed 
statement muddies the waters.  In providing that “It is understood that the storage of a 
protected work in digital form in an electronic medium constitutes a reproduction 
within the meaning of Article 9 of the Berne Convention,” the text scrupulously 
avoids detailing the meaning of “storage.”  If “storage” means retention for some 
more than transitory period of time, then it might add nothing to “any manner or 
form,” because “form” could imply a manifestation more concrete than a transient 
communication.145  If, however, the term “storage” was meant also to cover fleeting 
passage through a digital network, then one may wonder at the selection of a term 
whose ordinary meaning implies more lingering than just passing through.  Moreover, 
if the term is to be understood in its ordinary meaning, then one might question 
whether it also justifies a negative inference: if the copy of the work is not “stored” 
because it is transient, can it still be a reproduction?  In other words, the scope of the 
reproduction right that emerges from the Agreed statement remains open to highly 
variable interpretation. 146  
 
 In light of this drafting history, one cannot fairly affirm that the WCT or the 
Berne Convention oblige member States to bring transient digital copies within the 
scope of the reproduction right.  As a result, whether or not Cablevision correctly 
construes U.S. law, its interpretation would not place the U.S. in violation of its 
international obligations. 
 
 Does the interpretation nonetheless put the US at odds with the scope of the 
reproduction right articulated in the European Union?  Article 5(1) of the 2001 
“Information Society Directive,”147 exempts certain transient copies from the 
coverage of the reproduction right;148 the specification of an exemption for these 
                                                 
144 See, .e.g., von Lewinski, supra note 143, at ¶ 17.57 (the WCT “covers all acts of reproduction even 
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definition of a derivative work, “any other form in which the work may be recast, transformed or 
adapted”[emphasis added], to exclude unfixed, or extremely transient, alterations to a videogame).  
Indeed, the term could be viewed as constraining the art. 9(1) formulation, because, arguably, art 9(1) 
did not compel the conclusion that “form” excluded evanescent fixations, but “storage” lends itself 
much more to that reading.  That, however, would mean that the WCT narrows the scope of the 9(1) 
reproduction right, but this would not be permissible under art. 20 of the Berne Convention.  Accord, 
von Lewinski, supra note 140, at para 17.57. 
146  See, e.g., J. Sheinblatt, The WIPO Copyright Treaty, 13 Berk. Tech. LJ 535, 550 (1998) (both 
copyright  “maximalists” and copyright “minimalists” claimed to have been the victors in the WIPO 
Treaty process). 
147 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Official 
Journal L 167 , 22/06/2001 P. 0010 – 0019. 
148 Art. 5(1). provides: 
Temporary acts of reproduction referred to in Article 2, which are transient or incidental [and] 
an integral and essential part of a technological process and whose sole purpose is to enable: 
(a) a transmission in a network between third parties by an intermediary, or 
(b) a lawful use  
of a work or other subject-matter to be made, and which have no independent economic 
significance, shall be exempted from the reproduction right  . . . 
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copies promotes the inference that, without the exception, they would come within the 
scope of the reproduction right.  It is unlikely that the Cablevision buffer copies 
qualify for the exemption.  While the buffer copies “are transient or incidental [and] 
an integral and essential part of a technological process,” they must also have “no 
independent economic significance.”  The copies are economically significant: they 
are a necessary step in the process Cablevision devised to offer remote time shifting 
service to its – paying – subscribers.  On the other hand, it is not clear that their 
economic significance is “independent.”  The buffer copies, on their own, appear not 
to have any value;149 their value lies in the downstream copying that they enable.  
Indeed, it is not clear how copies which are by definition “transient” or “incidental” 
can have economic significance divorced from the process of which they are “an 
integral and essential part.”150  Assuming, nonetheless, that the buffer copies comply 
with the Directive’s prerequisites, there are two further alternative conditions.  The 
“sole purpose” of the copies must either be to enable “a transmission in a network 
between third parties by an intermediary” or a “lawful use.”  The first alternative does 
not apply: Cablevision is not a conduit service provider; it transmits the programming 
directly to its subscribers.  The second alternative, a “lawful use” by the recipients of 
the copies or communications that the buffer copies enable, requires examination of 
the Information Society’s private copying exception. 
 
 Article 5(2)(b) allows EU Member States to make an exception “in respect of 
reproductions on any medium made by a natural person for private use and for ends 
that are neither directly nor indirectly commercial, on condition that the rightholders 
receive fair compensation which takes account of the application or non-application 
of technological measures referred to in Article 6 to the work or subject-matter 
concerned.”  Cablevision’s failure to give the right holders “fair compensation” for 
end-user copying disqualifies its buffer copies from the exemption.  Arguably, if 
Cablevision were offering its service in a Member State which compensated private 
copying of television programming through a levy or similar administrative system, 
Cablevision would not itself be required to furnish that compensation.151  But were 
Cablevision serving subscribers in an EU Member lacking such measures, it seems 
that Cablevision would have to be the source of the compensation.  Because, on the 
facts of the case, the rightholders were not applying technological measures to the 
works, Cablevision could claim no offset from the compensation obligation.  Thus 
absent compensation provided by the State or the exploiter, a service such as 
Cablevision’s would not comply with EU copyright norms. 
 
B. Making Available 
 
 The WIPO Copyright Treaties require member States to protect the right of 
“communication to the public,” including the “making available to the public of their 
works in such a way that members of the public may access those works from a place 
                                                 
149 See Information Society Directive, Recital 33: “The acts of reproduction concerned should have no 
separate economic value on their own.” 
150 Cf. U.S. Copyright Office, DMCA Section 104 Report, supra note 24, at 53-54 (2001), available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/sec-104-report-vol-1.pdf (discussing whether 
temporary copies have economic value, and noting that there is disagreement among commentators).   
151 See Information Society Directive, Recital 38: “Member States should be allowed to provide for an 
exception or limitation to the reproduction right for certain types of reproduction of audio, visual and 
audio-visual material for private use, accompanied by fair compensation. This may include the 
introduction or continuation of remuneration schemes to compensate for the prejudice to rightholders.” 
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and at a time individually chosen by them.”152  The making available right targets on-
demand transmissions (whether by wire or wireless means), for it makes clear that the 
members of the public may be separated both in space and in time.  The technological 
means of ‘making available’ are irrelevant; the right is expressed in technologically 
neutral terms. The right covers offering the work to members of the public on an 
individualized basis;153 “the public” includes subsets of the general public, such as 
aficionados of tango music, or members of a particular performer’s fan club.  As is 
clear from the formulation “such a way that members of the public may access” 
(emphasis supplied), the right is triggered when the public is invited to access, rather 
than when any member of the public in fact has accessed.154  Equally importantly, the 
right applies to the “work”; it is not limited to “performances” of the work.  Thus it 
covers making the work available both as download and as a stream. 
 
Member States may comply with the right either through adopting a specific 
making available right, or through national laws providing for communication to the 
public, or, for those countries who have applied the distribution right to digital copies, 
through the right to distribute copies, as the United States urged during the drafting 
period.155  In adopting what came to be known as the “umbrella solution,” allowing 
member States to implement the making available right through any exclusive right 
under domestic law, the drafters opted for an approach of juridical as well as 
technological neutrality.156 
 
   As we have seen in Part I, recent U.S. caselaw casts doubt on the U.S.’ 
compliance with its obligation to implement the “making available” right.157  
Although the WIPO treaty language appears inspired by the U.S. Copyright Act’s 
definition of a public performance by transmission (“whether the members of the 
public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or 
in separate places and at the same time or at different times”), as U.S. v. ASCAP (in re 
America Online) illustrates, if the public performance right applies only to 
“performances,” then the right would not cover communication of a digital file whose 
contents are not being “rendered” when the member of the public receives the file.  If, 
however, courts entertain a more flexible concept of “performance,” extending to 
intermediate points on the “performance”/“reproduction” spectrum, then U.S. 
copyright law could reach a greater range of makings available of works of 
authorship.  Nonetheless, communication of an inert file for storage on the recipient’s 
computer or device (rather than for immediate, imminent, or limited performance 
                                                 
152 WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 8, WIPO Performers and Phonograms Treaty, arts. 10, 14.  
153 See von Lewinski, supra note 143 at ¶17.76 (making available right applies only to individualized 
access). 
154 See Ricketson and Ginsburg, supra, note 140 at ¶ 12.58 (“It is not necessary that the offer be 
accepted: ‘making available’ embraces incipient as well as effected communications.”); Capitol 
Records v Thomas, 2008 US Dist. LEXIS 84155 at *41 (“It is undisputed that the WCT and the WPPT 
recognize a making available right that is not dependent on proof that copies were actually transferred 
to particular individuals”). 
155 See RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON CERTAIN COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING 
RIGHTS QUESTIONS 675, ¶ 301 (WIPO, 1996). 
156 For extensive discussion of the ‘umbrella solution’, by the coiner of the term, see Mihály Ficsor, 
THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND THE INTERNET: THE 1996 WIPO TREATIES, THEIR INTERPRETATION AND 
IMPLEMENTATION 204–9, 496–509 (2003). See also Jorg Reinbothe and Silke von Lewinski, THE 
WIPO TREATIES 1996 102–3 and n 15 (2002). 
157 By contrast, the 2001 EU Information Society Directive adopts the WIPO Treaty language verbatim, 
see art. 3(1) and (2). 
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through the recipient’s computer or device) – that is, “pure downloads” – may remain 
a stumbling block.  In addition, the text of the definition of public performance may 
imply actual, rather than potential receipt of the communication (“members of the 
public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it”– emphasis 
supplied).  If so, then even if the public performance right covered all forms of digital 
transmissions, it would not reach offers to transmit.  Similarly, as we have seen in the 
decisions addressing the application of the distribution right to peer-to-peer file 
sharing, merely offering files for download does not meet the criteria for a 
“distribution of copies.”  Thus, while the “making available” of a work by streaming 
comes within the scope of U.S. copyright, the coverage of “making available” by 
offering downloads is far more uncertain.  If more courts adopt the London-Sire 
approach, presuming that an actual distribution (or transmission of a performance) has 
occurred when the rightholder demonstrates that the defendant took all the steps 
needed to enable the public to receive copies (or performances),158 then the U.S. may, 
as a practical matter approximate a “making available” right, but it may be too soon 
now to affirm the U.S.’ de facto compliance with its international obligation.  While 
U.S. courts could therefore assemble the doctrinal components of a “making 
available” right, at the moment in the U.S., the “umbrella” may be looking more like 
wind-tattered spokes than an effective cover for authors’ rights. 
 
It may seem surprising that U.S. courts would interpret the scope of the 
distribution right to exclude the offering of copies to the public when the United 
States’ treaty negotiators in 1996 represented that the US could implement the making 
available right through the distribution right,159 and have since concluded bilateral 
free trade agreements incorporating a making available right.160  Moreover, Congress 
in ratifying the 1996 WIPO Treaties and in enacting amendments to the U.S. 
Copyright Act to bring US law into compliance with treaty obligations did not 
perceive the necessity to amend the distribution right explicitly to cover the making 
available right.   
 
The District Court in Capitol Records v Thomas explicitly confronted, and 
rejected, the argument that the scope of US copyright should be interpreted in light of 
the international norms to which the US claims to adhere.  The court acknowledged 
the long-standing principle of statutory interpretation that directs courts to construe 
statutes consistently with treaties that the US has ratified.161  But, because the WIPO 
treaties are not self-executing, the court appears to have concluded that that canon of 
construction had little force.  Reference to US international obligations may be 
appropriate where the domestic law is ambiguous, the court held, but when the 
statutory language cannot reasonably be read consistently with the treaty norm, 
“concern for U.S. compliance with the WIPO treaties and the F[ree] T[rade] 
A[greement]s cannot override the clear congressional intent in § 106(3).”162 
                                                 
158 See text at notes 92-96 supra. 
159 See supra note 155. 
160 See, e.g., U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement, art. 17.5, May 18, 2004; U.S.-Bahrain Free Trade 
Agreement, art. 14.4.2, Sept. 14, 2004; U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, art. 16.4.2(a), May 6, 
2003. 
161 This principle is known as the “Charming Betsy doctrine,” after the 19th-century decision that 
enunciated it, Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) ("[A]n act of 
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction 
remains. . . .") 
162 2008 US Dist. LEXIS 84155 at *44. 
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As we have seen, most authorities have indeed interpreted section 106(3) to 
require actual distribution, not merely an offer to distribute.  But it does not 
necessarily follow that a “reasonable construction” of the excusive right to distribute 
the work in copies cannot include a “making available” right.  Arguably, that 
construction was implicit in Congress’ approach to ratification of the WIPO Treaties 
in 1998.  At that time, Congress adopted a package of amendments to the Copyright 
Act, including a new chapter 12 created to implement articles 11 and 12 of the WCT 
and 18 and 19 of the WPPT.  With Congress’ attention trained on what modifications 
were needed to comply with the international obligations the US was undertaking, 
Congress’ omission of a specific “making available” amendment might be interpreted 
as an expression of its understanding that the right was already covered, rather than as 
an oversight.  Statutory interpretation based on legislative inaction risks ridicule,163 
but in this case one can adduce more than mere legislative silence.  Where the 
legislative record combines specific actions and pertinent inactions, the total 
combination of what Congress did and did not do in passing an act to implement 
treaty obligations can be probative of its understanding of the compliance of the 
unamended portions with treaty norms.  In any event, if Congress’ 1998 amendments 
cannot fairly be treated as a gloss on the scope of the original 1976 distribution right, 
then, absent a procedural device such as London-Sire’s “deeming” distribution, the 
United States will have failed to live up to its international undertakings.164  
 
                                                 
163 See, e.g., Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 686 (1987): (“Congress’ silence is just that, 
silence.”) 
164 If the US is in violation of its obligations under the WIPO Treaties, there may be no effective 
international sanction.  To the extent that the WIPO Treaties do not merely clarify, but expand rights 
under the Berne Convention, the Dispute Settlement mechanisms established in the TRIPs Accord with 
respect to violations of Berne Convention rights (other than moral rights) will not apply.  If the 
“making available” right was already comprehended within the “communication to the public” right of 
Berne arts. 11, 11bis, 11ter, 14 and 14bis, then TRIPs sanctions could apply.  But the Berne 
Convention probably did not require that member States accord a “making available” right.  See 
Ricketson and Ginsburg, supra note 140, at ¶12.57. 
